Civil-Military Relations

Module Descriptor: Civil-Military Relations	
Title:	**Civil-Military Relations**
Description:	Functions of Civil-Military Relations in the State, between States, and other non state actors, significance, structure and processes, institutions, policy and legal framework, responsibility of the institutions involved in Civil-Military Relations.
Period	Year 3 semester 2
Teaching Hours:	50 hours directed study. 100 hours independent study. 150 hours in total
Module Aims:	• To enable students understand and be able to put into practice the functions of Civil-Military Relations in determining the operations of the state in its foreign relations with other states.
Learning Outcomes:	• By the end of this course the students should be able to perform duties to do with Civil-Military Relations professionally in their day to day operations as professionals in the careers evolved from Bachelors in international Relations and Diplomatic Studies.

Civil-Military Relations Concepts

INTRODUCTION

Civil-military relations is one of the truly interdisciplinary fields of study in social science. Historians, sociologists, political scientists, and policy analysts all have made major contributions to the field and, perhaps more surprising, regularly read and respond to each other's work in this area. The interdisciplinary nature is neatly captured in the subfield's indispensable lead journal, *Armed Forces & Society*, and may help explain why nominally mainstream but increasingly insular political science journals such as *American Political Science Review* have made less of a contribution to the subfield in the past few decades.

This essay focuses on the political science component of the subfield, making mention of associated disciplines as necessary. Political scientists, as distinct from historians, tend to look for patterned generalizations of cause and effect. Political scientists seek not so much to describe what happened in a particular instance as to explain what happens in general and, if possible, predict what is likely to happen in the next case, given the ceteris paribus constraint. As distinct from sociologists, political scientists focus primarily on institutions of political control. Factors of direct concern to sociologists—for instance, the integration of the military with society—are of interest only insofar as they may relate causally to the primary political question of who decides what, when, how, and with what effect. Sociologists and historians would no doubt balk at the prominence given to political science theory in this essay. The nomothetic versus ideographic debate plays out in this area as in others, and it is not clear that political science is the lead discipline in the study of civil-military relations anyway. But sociologists and historians are likely to pay greater attention to political theoretical developments in this field than they would in other political science subfields. This is, then, an unabashedly parochial review of the political science civil-military literature, but one with at least an eye directed at associated disciplines.

Although relations between civilian and martial spheres, broadly construed, have preoccupied political philosophers for thousands of years, the modern intellectual history largely dates to the pre–World War II literature on antimilitarism, especially Vagts (1937), Lasswell (1941). The second large wave of literature came in the early Cold War period, as American social scientists struggled to reconcile the need for a permanent and large standing army with America's traditional suspicions of the threats to liberty posed by standing armies (Kerwin 1948, Smith 1951, Lasswell 1950, Ekirch 1956, Mills 1956, Millis et al 1958). Huntington's landmark study, *The Soldier and the State* (1957), was the capstone to this early work, and most of what has been written since has been an explicit or implicit response to his argument.

After Huntington, the field split along two distinct tracks. The first and arguably more fruitful was a sociologically oriented examination of the military, first in the United States and then extending to other countries. The landmark study, Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960), spawned literally hundreds of follow-on studies exploring the relationship between society and the armed forces (Moskos 1970, 1971;, Larson 1974;, Segal et al 1974;, Sarkesian 1975;, Segal 1975;, Bachman et al 1977;, Janowitz 1977;, Moskos 1977;, Segal 1986;, Moskos & Wood 1988;, Edmonds 1988;, Burk 1993;, Sarkesian et al 1995). The second track was an institutionally oriented examination of postcolonial civil-military relations in developing countries, a project dominated by political scientists (Finer 1962;, Huntington 1968;, Stepan

1971, 1988;, Perlmutter 1977;, Welch 1976;, Nordlinger 1977) and largely focused on the problem of coups; this track has spawned numerous specialty literatures considering civil-military relations in specific contexts—in communist regimes (Kolkowicz 1966, Herspring & Volgyes 1978, Colton 1979, Rice 1984, Colton & Gustafson 1990, Zisk 1993, Herspring 1996), in ethnically divided polities (Horowitz 1980, 1985), in authoritarian and postauthoritarian regimes (Rouquie 1982, Frazer 1994, Aguero 1995), and so on.[2]Although this essay addresses the literature across the board, special attention will be given to civil-military relations within democracies and, within that set, civil-military relations in the United States because the American case has figured so prominently in the theoretical development of the field.

Although the sociological school dominated the study of American civil-military relations, the Vietnam War trauma produced a flurry of empirically rich studies by political scientists that remain important even 20 or 30 years later (Kolodziej 1966, Yarmolinsky 1971, 1974;, Russett & Stepan 1973;, Russett & Hanson 1975;, Betts 1977). The literature continued to prove fruitful, especially its analyses of the implications of the end of the draft, gender issues, and the role of public opinion (Stiehm 1981, 1989, 1996;, Cohen 1985;, Petraeus 1987;, Russett 1990). This literature greatly contributed to our understanding of civil-military issues but did not present a direct theoretical challenge to the dominant Huntingtonian or Janowitzean paradigms. As discussed in the penultimate section of this essay, however, the end of the Cold War has sparked a renaissance of attention to civil-military relations in the United States, much of it as theoretically ambitious as the early work of Huntington and Janowitz. If the past is any guide, this new work, which began as a response to questions raised in the American context, will generate a larger literature treating comparative questions in a new way.

The essay proceeds in seven parts. I begin with a discussion of the central problem underlying all analyses of civil-military relations, which I call the civil-military problematique. I then identify the three forms of analysis—normative, descriptive, and theoretical—that comprise political science's contribution to our understanding of civil-military relations. The next two sections briefly review the political science literature on civil-military relations, parsing scholars according to the different dependent and independent variables stressed in their work. The antepenultimate section addresses in more detail the range of civilian control mechanisms identified by the literature. The penultimate section highlights the recent renaissance in the study of American civil-military relations. I conclude with a brief discussion of promising questions for future research.

THE PROBLEMATIQUE

The civil-military problematique is a simple paradox: The very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity.[3]This derives from the agency inherent in civilization. We form communities precisely because we cannot provide for all our needs and therefore must depend on other people or institutions to do our bidding. Civilization involves delegation, assigning decision making from the individual to the collective (in the form of a leader or leaders) and consigning the societal protection function from the leader to specialists or institutions responsible for violence.

The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war. One purpose behind establishing the military in the first place is the need, or perceived need, for military force, either to attack other groups or to ward off attacks by others.

Like an automobile's airbag, the military primarily exists as a guard against disaster. It should be always ready even if it is never used. Moreover, military strength should be sized appropriately to meet the threats confronting the polity. It serves no purpose to establish a protection force and then to vitiate it to the point where it can no longer protect. Indeed, an inadequate military institution may be worse than none at all. It could be a paper tiger inviting outside aggression—strong enough in appearance to threaten powerful enemies but not strong enough in fact to defend against their predations. Alternatively, it could lull leaders into a false confidence, leading them to rash behavior and then failing in the ultimate military contest.

On the other hand, just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect. Because the military must face enemies, it must have coercive power, the ability to force its will on others. But coercive power often gives it the capability to enforce its will on the community that created it. A direct seizure of political power by the military is the traditional worry of civil-military relations theory and a consistent pattern in human history. Less obvious, but just as sinister, is the possibility that a parasitic military will destroy society by draining it of resources in a quest for ever greater strength as a hedge against the enemies of the state. Yet another concern is that a rogue military could involve the polity in wars and conflicts contrary to society's interests or expressed will. And, finally, there is a concern over the simple matter of obedience: Even if the military does not destroy society, will it obey its civilian masters, or will it use its considerable coercive power to resist civilian direction and pursue its own interests?

This is a variant of the basic problem of governance that lies at the core of political science: making the government strong enough to protect the citizens but not so strong as to become tyrannical. The tension between the two desiderata is inherent in any civilization, but it is especially acute in democracies, where the protectees' prerogatives are thought to trump the protectors' at every turn—where the metaphorical delegation of political authority to agents is enacted at regular intervals through the ballot box.[4]Democratic theory is summed in the epigram that the governed should govern. People may choose political agents to act on their behalf, but that should in no way mean that the people have forfeited their political privileges. Most of democratic theory is concerned with devising ways to insure that the people remain in control even as professionals conduct the business of government. Civil-military relations are just a special, extreme case for democratic theory, involving designated political agents controlling designated military agents.

It follows that, in a democracy, the hierarchy of de jure authority favors civilians over the military, even in cases where the underlying distribution of de facto power favors the military. Regardless of how strong the military is, civilians are supposed to remain the political masters. While decision making may in fact be politics as usual—the exercise of power in pursuit of ends—it is politics within the context of a particular normative conception of whose will should prevail. Civilian competence in the general sense extends even beyond their competence in a particular sense; that is, civilians are morally and politically competent to make the decisions even if they do not possess the relevant technical competence in the form of expertise (Dahl 1985). This is the core of the democratic alternative to Plato's philosopher king. Although the expert may understand the issue better, the expert is not in a position to determine the value that the people attach to different issue outcomes. In the civil-military context, this means that the military may be best able to identify the threat and the appropriate responses to that threat for a given level of risk, but only the civilian can set the level of acceptable risk for society. The military can propose the level of armaments necessary to have a certain probability of successful

defense against our enemies, but only the civilian can say what probability of success society is willing to underwrite. The military can describe in some detail the nature of the threat posed by a particular enemy, but only the civilian can decide whether to feel threatened, and if so, how or even whether to respond. The military assesses the risk, the civilian judges it.

The democratic imperative insists that this precedence applies even if civilians are woefully underequipped to understand the technical issues at stake. Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be, the civilian view trumps it. Civilians should get what they ask for, even if it is not what they really want. In other words, civilians have a right to be wrong.

The two central desiderata—protection by the military and protection from the military—are in tension because efforts to assure the one complicate efforts to assure the other. If a society relentlessly pursues protection from external enemies, it can bankrupt itself. If society minimizes the strength of the military so as to guard against a military seizure of political power, it can leave itself vulnerable to predations from external enemies. It may be possible to procure a goodly amount of both kinds of protection—certainly the United States seems to have had success in securing a large measure of protection both by and from the military—but tradeoffs at the margins are inevitable.

Even if a society achieves adequate levels of assurance against utter collapse at either extreme, battlefield defeat and coup, there is a range of problematic activities in which the military can engage. It remains difficult to ensure that the military is both capable of doing and willing to do what civilians ask. Thus, "solving" the problem of coups does not neutralize the general problem of control on an ongoing basis.

THREE FORMS OF ANALYSIS

In general, political science consists of three forms of analysis: normative, empirical/descriptive, and theoretical. Each component makes important contributions to the study of civil-military relations. Normative analysis asks what ought to be done, how much civilian control is enough, and what can be done to improve civil-military relations. Because civilian control of the military is of such great policy importance, the normative approach often plays a central role in the study of civil-military relations. Political science's answers to the normative questions are various criteria concerning how much control (and of what type) is enough to satisfy the definition of civilian control or civilian supremacy (Huntington 1957, Colton 1979, Edmonds 1988, Aguero 1995, Kemp & Hudlin 1992, Ben Meir 1995, Kohn 1997, Boene 1997).

The normative lens draws explicitly on the empirical/descriptive lens, which seeks to describe cases in accurate detail. Applied to the problem of civil-military relations, the empirical/descriptive lens involves developing typologies of various forms of civilian control or lack thereof—for instance, Welch's (1976) distinction between military influence and military control or Ben Meir's (1995) fivefold typology of military roles (advisory, representative, executive, advocacy, and substantive). The key task for this kind of analysis is distinguishing between reality and rhetoric, between what appears to be the case and what in fact is the case. Measured by sheer volume, the bulk of the civil-military relations literature consists of empirical/descriptive treatments of the civil-military scene in different countries or regions. Area studies specialists have long noted the centrality of civil-military issues to political life in various regions—indeed, civil-military relations is a central preoccupation in most area studies subliteratures, except those dealing with the United States and Western Europe. As a

consequence, there is a rich literature describing the ebb and flow of relations between the armed forces and the polity (Boene 1990, Zagorski 1992, Danopoulos & Watson 1996, Diamond & Plattner 1996, Lovell & Albright 1997, Zamora 1997).

Also implicit in the normative lens are conclusions drawn from the third form of analysis, the theoretical lens. The theoretical approach may also begin with typology development, but then it moves on to advance propositional statements of cause and effect. It is impossible to recommend a certain course of action without making an implicit predictive claim of cause and effect: A state should do *X* because then *Y* will happen, and otherwise *Z* will happen (where *Y* is "better" than *Z*). The theoretical approach distinguishes between the things to be explained/predicted, called dependent variables (DVs)—for example, coups or robustness of civilian control—and the things doing the explaining/predicting, called independent or explanatory variables (IVs), such as the degree of military professionalism or the type of civilian governmental structure. The theoretical approach specifies ways in which changes in the IVs are reflected in changes in the DVs. As the following two sections document, political science's contribution to the subfield of civil-military relations can be evaluated in terms of successive theoretical debates over what the most important DVs and IVs are.

WHAT IS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE?

Traditionally, civil-military relations theory has focused on the direct seizure of political power by the military, i.e. the coup. With the remarkable spread of democratic governance over the past several decades, the question of coups remains interesting, but it is by no means the only interesting civil-military phenomenon to be explained. Accordingly, it makes sense to distinguish between a variety of DVs, any one of which might be the most important or interesting in a particular region at a particular time. The next five subsections describe a list of DVs adapted from Desch (1999). The evaluation of the list is my own.

Coups

Coups are the traditional focus of civil-military relations because they so dramatically symbolize the central problem of the military exploiting their coercive strength to displace civilian rulers. Under the general heading of coups, political scientists have looked at two related but distinct questions: on the one hand, the instance or frequency of coups (or coups attempted), and on the other hand, the probability that a coup will be successful. Classical civil-military relations theory has primarily addressed the former. Both Huntington (1957) and his earliest critic, Finer (1962), address the propensity of military institutions to coup, as do subsequent studies by Bienen (1968), Nordlinger (1977), Horowitz (1980), Thompson (1975, 1976), Jackman (1978), Perlmutter (1977), O'Kane (1981), Zimmermann (1983), Johnson et al (1984), Bienen & Van de Walle (1990), Londregan & Poole (1990), Frazer (1994). Luttwak (1979), in an iconoclastic analysis, addressed the second question of how to conduct a coup successfully, and coup success is also covered in Zimmermann (1983), Bienen & Van de Walle (1990), Frazer (1994).

Coups are a problematic focus for future studies of civil-military relations, however, because looking only at coups can underestimate military influence. A coup may indicate military strength, at least compared to the other political actors the military suppresses. But it can also indicate military weakness, reflecting the military's inability to get what it wants through the normal political process. In this way, the dog that does not bark may be the more powerful and, for ascertaining whether or not the democracy is robust, the more important dog. Moreover,

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while coups have not entirely disappeared, they are certainly less frequent in many regions, and the coup success rate has also fallen (Zagorski 1996, Hunter 1998). Thus, theories explaining the propensity to coup would yield fairly consistent null predictions in many cases, missing interesting and important changes in the nature of civil-military relations over time. Most recent work on civil-military relations, therefore, has focused on other issues.

Military Influence

Because the coup/no-coup dichotomy misses much of the interesting give and take in civil-military relations, some theorists have preferred to study military influence instead. Whereas the coup variable is dichotomous, the influence variable is continuous, or at least offers more than two gradations. The focus on military influence captures the idea that the military institution may be politically powerful even (or perhaps especially) when it does not seize direct power through a forceful takeover.

Even the classic texts on civil-military relations recognized that the problem of civil-military relations was larger than a question of coups. Huntington (1957:20) observed, for instance, that "the problem of the modern state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician." Finer (1962), Janowitz (1960) likewise acknowledged the utility of a non-dichotomous variable. Finer added a third possibility, covert intervention, and Janowitz, although not explicit on the point, treated civil-military relations as a continuum. Subsequent theorists, including Stepan (1971, 1988), Welch (1976), Nordlinger (1977), Colton (1979), Rice (1984), Pion-Berlin (1992), Brooks (1999), all add additional gradations to the military influence variable.

Military influence is much harder to measure than coups, however, and the measurement problem limits its theoretical usefulness. Nordlinger (1977) addressed this problem by inventing a tripartite typology of praetorianism, consisting of moderators, guardians, and rulers. His typology, however, only captures varieties of overt military control and misses the far more nuanced and more interesting situation where the military is able to shape government actions without directly controlling them. Stepan's (1988) second measure of civilian control, the extent of military institutional prerogatives, is a superior gauge of influence because it explicitly includes military behavior short of insubordination by force. Stepan traces prerogatives through 11 issue areas ranging from defense policy to the legal system. As Stepan defines civilian control, however, it is not a very sensitive metric; he allows for essentially only two codings—low and high (he also has a "moderate" category in three instances: active military participation in the cabinet, the role of the police, and the military role in state enterprises). Colton (1979) offers a still more sensitive operationalization of the influence DV by distinguishing between four types of policy issues over which the military exercises influence (internal, institutional, intermediate, and societal) and by distinguishing between the four means used (official prerogative, expert advice, political bargaining, and force). Colton's approach offers considerable analytical leverage over questions of military influence short of a coup, but it is not clear that he successfully overcomes the problem of hidden influence and civilian abdication.

A related problem of the influence DV is that a particular normative claim of what ought to be the proper sphere of military influence is often implicit in the concept. While the normative line may be easy to draw in the coup setting, it is debatable in other settings. Should the military decide tactical questions only? What about tactical questions of special importance, such as nuclear tactics? In some countries, most notably the United States, the challenge of designing the

proper division of labor between "military matters" and "civilian matters" has driven much of the civil-military conflict (Feaver 1992, 1996). Indeed, the oldest debate in civil-military relations concerns fusionism, the argument that the line between the military and the political has become so blurred that the distinction has lost its smeaning (Boene 1990).

Fusionism arose out of the public management school as a logical response to the World War II experience of total war, and appeared even more reasonable in the face of such Cold War exigencies as a permanent and large military establishment and the threat of nuclear annihilation (Sapin & Snyder 1954). Huntington (1957) positioned his treatise as a self-conscious rejection of fusionism. Every half decade or so since, someone revives fusionism as the inevitable consequence of whatever military mission seems ascendant at that time: nuclear strategy and limited war (Lyons 1961, Janowitz 1960), counterinsurgency (Barrett 1965, Russett & Stepan 1973, Slater 1977), crisis management (Betts 1977), or peacekeeping operations (Tarr & Roman 1995, Roman & Tarr 1995, Hahn 1997). What is puzzling in fusionism's cyclical rebirth is that it is not clear who is killing it; in other words, why must the fusionist insight be revived every five years? My own answer is that fusionism is self-negating. It overreaches by confusing overlap between the functions of the civilian and military spheres with a merging of the spheres themselves. The spheres are necessarily analytically distinct—a distinction that derives from democratic theory and the agency inherent in political community—and so every fusionist scholar finds him- or herself beginning anew from the same point of departure. The spheres are also necessarily distinct in practice—it matters whether the policy maker wears a uniform or not—and so fusionist scholars find that their subjects repeatedly revive the idea of difference even as they provide evidence of overlaps with the activities of actors from different spheres. In short, what makes the overlap of functions interesting is the fact that it is overlaid on an even more fundamental separation (Williams 1997). This is not to say that fusionism provides no insights. On the contrary, it is a logical point of departure for descriptive empirical work, and some of the best empirical work on the subject is fusionist (Ben Meir 1995, Tarr & Roman 1995). It has, however, proven less fruitful for theory development.

Civil-Military Friction

A focus on civil-military conflict compensates for the difficulties that attend the coup and influence DVs. Even in a coup-free society, there are still likely to be episodes of friction and conflict, so this DV is generalizable. Indeed, the recent renaissance of the study of American civil-military relations discussed in the penultimate section of this essay has been triggered by the heightened acrimony that has characterized the civil-military relationship over the past five or six years. Stepan (1988) makes friction an integral part of his analysis of Brazilian civil-military relations, calling it "military contestation," and it is central to Ben Meir's (1995) analysis of the Israeli case as well. Friction can be measured as the degree to which the military is willing to display public opposition to an announced civilian policy. Moreover, friction is not a trivial concern. Too much friction could be indications and warnings of a coup in the offing. In contrast with "military influence," it has the virtue of being relatively easy to measure, since evidence of friction and conflict is likely to find its way into the public record.

Yet it seems a second-order consideration, at least in terms of the central civil-military problematique of agency and control. Friction is more a consequence of different patterns of civilian control than it is a civilian control issue itself. It is worthwhile relating different forms of control to the presence of friction, but the presence or absence of friction does not directly capture the problem of civilian control.

Military Compliance

Because of the problems attending these DVs, more recent work focuses on yet a fourth formulation: whether military or civilian preferences prevail when there is a policy dispute (Kemp & Hudlin 1992, Weigley 1993, Kohn 1994, Desch 1999, Feaver 1998a). This DV has the obvious advantage of reflecting the essence of the normative democratic principle that the will of civilians should prevail in all cases. It also has the empirical advantage of varying across different democracies and different periods of time; even in "mature" democracies like the United States, there are instances of the military prevailing against civilian leaders on certain policy questions, as the 1993 debate over gays in the military showed. Moreover, there are many times when civilian governments defer to a military demand rather than test military subordination.

Military compliance is not without analytical limitations as a DV, however. For starters, it suffers from something like the "dog that does not bark" problem afflicting the coups DV. Once a dispute has gone public, it is possible, though not necessarily easy, to determine whose preferences prevail at the decision-making stage. It is much more difficult, however, to determine whose preferences are prevailing on the countless issues that are resolved before a dispute gains public attention. A particularly adept military could enjoy enough political influence to shape policy without the issue gaining salience as a major policy dispute. Likewise, focusing on the policy-decision stage risks missing compliance issues that arise at the later policy implementation stage.

Delegation and Monitoring

Some recent work also considers yet another aspect of civil-military relations, the degree of delegation and the types of monitoring mechanisms used by civilian society (P Feaver, unpublished manuscript). This DV is tailored for the American case, where many of the traditional DVs (e.g. coups) simply are not very interesting. Therefore, a theoretical focus on delegation and monitoring may be a particularly fruitful line of analysis for newly stable democracies, offering explanatory leverage over civil-military relations even (or especially) in cases where the basic problem of ensuring civilian rule seems to be solved. At the same time, conceptualizing the DV as delegation and monitoring may sidestep questions of direct policy interest, such as whether the military is going to coup and/or whether the military is going to comply with civilian direction. The delegation and monitoring focus is not irrelevant to those questions—indeed, different patterns of delegation and monitoring influence the degree to which the military has incentives to comply with civilian direction—but its relationship is indirect. To the extent that the study is motivated by a desire to answer those questions, one of the other conceptualizations of the DV may be more profitable.

WHAT ARE THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES?

Explanatory factors can be differentiated according to whether they are external or internal to the country. External factors that require a large army (such as the presence of a security threat), or pressure in the form of targeted aid and "advice" from particularly influential great powers, can influence the shape of a country's civil-military relations. Internal factors include such determinants as the nature of dominant cleavages in society, whether the society faces an internal threat or civil war, the nature of the domestic political system, and the distribution of wealth. A few scholars, notably Huntington (1957), Lasswell (1941, 1950), Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson

(1995), emphasize the importance of external systemic factors in shaping civil-military relations. Similarly, Aguero (1995) concluded that the presence of an external threat against which transitional civilian leaders could focus defense policy was an important factor explaining the success of transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes. In general, however, political scientists (including Aguero) have found greater explanatory leverage from internal factors (Colton 1979, Colton & Gustafson 1990, Finer 1962, Horowitz 1980, Horowitz 1985, Janowitz 1960, Nordlinger 1977, Perlmutter 1977, Rouquie 1982, Stepan 1971, Stepan 1988, Vagts 1937, Welch 1976), and some of the most interesting recent work attempts to integrate both internal and external factors (Desch 1999).

Explanatory variables internal to the state can be further differentiated according to the civilian/military distinction itself: Does the causal factor relate to features of civilian society or to features of the military? For instance, Huntington's (1957, 1968) two classic works touching on civil-military relations constitute something of a debate between explanatory variables; his early work emphasizes a military factor, namely the degree of professionalism in the officer corps, and his later work emphasizes a civilian factor, namely the degree of institutionalization within civilian society. Nordlinger (1977) locates the primary causal factors for coups in the political sociology of the officer corps. In contrast, Welch (1976) emphasizes the legitimacy and efficiency of civilian government as an important deterrent to coups.

Within the civilian sphere, it is possible to distinguish still further between ethnocultural, economic, ideological, and political factors. Enloe (1980) emphasizes ethnic identity and ethnic cleavages as the dominant shaping force in civil-military relations. Campbell (1990), on the other hand, emphasizes the economic pressure of fiscal stringency and its impact on Soviet civil-military relations. Huntington (1957) emphasizes the different ways in which three competing ideologies, liberalism, conservatism, and Marxism, conceive military affairs and how these conceptions lead to different patterns of civil-military relations in liberal, conservative, and communist societies. Aguero (1995) combines a variety of economic and organizational factors into an index of relative civilian and military political power.

A final set of IVs deserves mention: factors arising from the transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Danopoulos 1988a, b, 1992).[5]The conventional wisdom holds that the age and robustness of the democracy are important in determining the country's pattern of civil-military relations. At least where civilian control of the military is concerned, success breeds success and failure breeds failure. But the nature (as distinct from the newness) of the transition to democracy may also be a causal factor shaping civil-military relations. Frazer (1994) offers the counterintuitive finding that, at least in Africa, a peaceful transition from the colonial period to independence augurs less well for enduring civilian control than does a violent transition. She argues that civilians who inherit power peacefully have not developed the necessary institutional counterweights to forestall future coups by the military. In contrast, a state resulting from an armed struggle with the colonial power will have sufficient experience in maintaining political control over the military or, more importantly, may have inadvertently created strong armed counterweights to the traditional military and so will be able to keep the military in check. A similar logic may also hold in transitions from authoritarian regimes; institutional solutions developed during the transition in response to civil-military conflict, in the form of contested policy goals, can ultimately strengthen the hand of civilian authorities over the long run (Trinkunas 1999).

Busza (1996) has compared the experience of Poland and Russia and traced how leaders make key policy choices during the transition to democracy about the rules that will govern civil-military affairs. The institutional rules then shape civilian and military preferences, creating incentives either for subordination or for insubordination. Aguero (1995) likewise emphasizes the policy trajectory established during the transition, tracing the endurance of civilian supremacy to the following five factors: whether the authoritarian regime had been militarized or civilianized; whether the transition was gradual or precipitous; the relative degree of internal unity of the civilian and military actors; the degree of mass public support for emerging civilian structures; and the extent to which civilians were able to develop expertise on defense matters. The record of the various former–Warsaw Pact countries suggests that another important issue may be whether establishing civilian control structures becomes a de facto prerequisite for the transitioning state to join a desirable organization such as NATO (Danopoulos & Zirker 1996, Michta 1997).

One of the weaknesses in the civil-military relations literature is that there are relatively few efforts to systematically compare explanatory factors or to identify the conditions under which one set of factors has more explanatory leverage than another. Even where different sets of factors are pitted against each other, it is rare for the analyst to do more than give rough comparable weights to one or the other. Zimmermann's (1983) excellent review of the literature on coups catalogues 18 determinants of coups, ranging from economic factors to social mobilization to external military aid. Although he stops short of providing clear weighting for each factor, he does show that the study of coups has progressed the farthest in comparing explanatory variables, perhaps because for that issue area the DV is relatively easy to operationalize. Desch (1999) is another compelling example of an effort to specify rigorously the conditions under which one set of factors has better explanatory leverage over civil-military relations than another.

It is worth noting that civil-military relationships can themselves serve as explanatory factors, IVs explaining other political phenomena of interest. Of course, inherent in the civil-military problematique is the notion that different patterns of relations differentially contributed to military effectiveness and the provision of adequate national security (Huntington 1957); more recently, this idea has been operationalized in a study comparing the abilities of states to exploit advantages in military technology (Biddle & Zirkle 1996). Studies show that different patterns of civil-military relations lead to different forms of nuclear command and control and therefore to differentially dangerous forms of nuclear proliferation (Feaver 1992, 1992/1993;, Sagan 1994). Other studies argue that pathologies in civil-military relationships may make a state prone to war, or at least likely to adopt offensive strategies (Snyder 1984, Van Evera 1984). Still others have explored whether different patterns of civil-military relations lead to differential propensities to innovate in doctrine (Avant 1994;, Kier 1997;, Posen 1984;, Rosen 1991, 1996;, Zisk 1993). And, of course, patterns of civil-military relations can be used to explain defense spending and weapons procurement decisions (Rosen 1973, Jackman 1976, Zuk & Thompson 1982, Londregan & Poole 1990).

WHAT ARE THE CONTROL MECHANISMS?

As the preceding sections document, the literature has progressed from the original DV of coups and the original IV of military professionalism. Yet, while empirical and theoretical treatments of civil-military relations have progressed, the normative focus underlying the field has remained remarkably constant: How can civilians exercise better control over the military? This normative

impulse begs the prior question of how civilians do exercise control over the military. Although political science has not produced the definitive answer, it has assisted the effort by cataloguing and evaluating different control mechanisms.

Civilian control techniques can be grouped into two broad categories: (*a*) those that affect the ability of the military to subvert control and (*b*) those that affect the disposition of the military to be insubordinate (Finer 1962, Welch 1976).

The options under the first category are inherently limited. Most countries employ some sort of constitutional and administrative restraints that legally bind the military in a subservient position (Damrosch 1995). These measures, however, only restrain the military insofar as the military abides by the measures. They are legal frameworks for civilian control, but they are not really mechanisms that affect the ability of the military to subvert. In an effort to force potentially reluctant militaries to respect the legal framework, the civilian government can choose to deploy the military far from the centers of political power, as in the ancient Roman practice of garrisoning troops on the periphery of the empire. Alternatively, or in tandem, the civilian government can keep the army divided and weak relative to the civilian government. Societies that do not face grave external threats may choose to keep the regular army small in size or rely on a mobilized citizenry for defense; this was the preferred option of the United States until the twentieth century. This approach is risky, however, for (depending on geography and/or technology) it may make the country vulnerable to outside threats.

Countries that face an external threat, or regimes that feel the need for large forces to preserve power, may deploy sizable armed forces but keep them divided, perhaps by setting various branches against each other or using secret police and other parallel chains of command to keep the military in check (Frazer 1994, Belkin 1998). In fact, the use of countervailing institutions such as border guards, secret police, paramilitary forces, militias, presidential guards, and so on is one of the most common forms of control, used both by autocracies (the Ottoman Empire) and democracies (Switzerland and the United States). Of course, even this effort may erode the ability of the military to execute its primary function of defending the society against external threats (Biddle & Zirkle 1996).

Welch (1976) suggests that, by developing a high degree of specialization in the army, a country may reduce the military's capacity to intervene without affecting its capacity to defend the republic. A large and highly specialized military might find it difficult to pull off a coup simply due to coordination problems. Thus, modern armed forces might be optimized for battlefield performance—each specialist performing his or her role in synchrony with the others—and yet be unable to execute a domestic power grab because all the parts would not know how to coordinate in this novel operation. Welch is correct only if the specialized military does not decide to devote training time to such power grabs. As Welch himself notes, increased functional specialization only increases the complexity of a coup plot. There is nothing inherently limiting about size or role specification that would frustrate a determined military.

Since most efforts to reduce the *ability* of the military to subvert civilian government simultaneously weaken it vis-à-vis external threats, theorists have emphasized instead efforts to reduce the military's *disposition* to intervene. Any military strong enough to defend civilian society is also strong enough to destroy it. It is therefore essential that the military choose not to exploit its advantage, voluntarily submitting to civilian control. Finer (1962), noting that civilian control of the military is not "natural," argues that, given the political strengths of the military,

the real puzzle is how civilians are able at all to exercise control—and the key to the puzzle, Finer says, is military disposition.

Under this category, the most prominent mechanism is the principle itself, which is variously called the "cult of obedience," the "norm of civilian control," or simply "professionalism" (Welch 1976, Smith 1951, Huntington 1957). Hendrickson (1988) concludes that no amount of institutional tinkering can ensure civilian control; the real basis of civilian control is the ethic that governs the relationship between civilians and the military. This is what organizational theorists call nonhierarchical control (Bouchard 1991).

The necessity of focusing on the military's disposition to intervene turns the civil-military problem into what can be understood as a form of the classic principal-agent relationship, with civilian principals seeking ways to ensure that the military agents are choosing to act appropriately even though they have the ability to shirk (Feaver 1998a). To develop this norm of obedience, civilians can employ two basic techniques, which follow the traditional principal-agent pattern: efforts to minimize either the adverse selection problem or the moral hazard problem. In civil-military terms, this translates to (*a*) adjusting the ascriptive characteristics of the military so that it will be populated by people inclined to obey, and (*b*) adjusting the incentives of the military so that, regardless of their nature, the members will prefer to obey.

Virtually all societies have used accession policy to influence ascriptive features of the military. For instance, European countries restricted military service, and especially officer commissions, to privileged castes such as the aristocracy or particular religious groups (e.g. Catholics in France). Americans adopted the mirror opposite approach, expanding military service through the militia in order to have the military reflect as much as possible the republican virtues of citizen-soldiers.[6]Different mixes of selected service, short-term universal service, and merit-based commissions are likewise effective in reducing the military's disposition to subvert civilian control by changing the character of the people that make up the military. The sociological school of civil-military relations embraces this tool and operationalizes it in terms of integrating the military with society (Larson 1974, Moskos & Wood 1988, Moskos & Butler 1996). A variant of this approach is prominent in communist and fascist countries, which have used party membership and political commissars to shape the attitudinal structure of the senior officer corps, if not the lower ranks (Kolkowicz 1966, Herspring & Volgyes 1978, Colton 1979, Herspring 1996).

There are limits to the accession tool, however. As Huntington (1957) argues, tinkering with ascriptive characteristics, an element of what he calls "subjective control," can politicize the military such that it becomes an arena for the political struggle of the various civilian groups represented or not represented in the accession policy. Without using the term, Vagts (1937) goes into more detail on these "subjective" measures of civilian control and shows how they can politicize the military in unhealthy ways.

One way to gain some of the benefits of restrictive accession policy without the negative side effects of subjective control is through training. Thus, every recruit, regardless of social origin, is molded by careful training to adopt the characteristics desired by society—in this case, every recruit is indoctrinated with the ideal of civilian control. This approach is implicit in Huntington's (1957) emphasis on professionalism. Training is also the long pole in the civilian control tent of Janowitz (1960) and the sociological school.

Yet, there is considerable difficulty in operationalizing civilian control of the military by changing the ethic of the military. Arguably, training officers in liberal arts colleges as a complement to the official military academies constitutes an important, albeit subtle, form of civilian control. Officers so trained are likely to bring to their jobs a wider world view, certainly more "civilian" in perspective than their purely military peers. However, as opposition to ROTC programs in the United States shows, it is possible to view these programs not as instruments of civilian control but as evidence of creeping militarism in civilian society: enshrining military influence and opportunities for propaganda within the walls of the liberal (civilian) bastion (Ekirch 1956, Sherry 1995). A strong ROTC program can either be an indication of subtle civilian control over the composition of the military or weak capitulation of civilian society to an all-pervasive military value structure.

If the civilians cannot completely change the nature of the military, they can seek to adjust the military's incentives to encourage proper subordination. Some versions of this are particularly base. For instance, the Romans essentially bribed the capitol garrison to keep it out of politics. Political loyalty is similarly bought among many developing world armed forces, where substantial corruption opportunities give them a stake in the survival of the civilian regime. Guarantees of wages and benefits function much like these bribes—guarantees that, if broken, are a likely trigger for coup attempts. Bribes are very problematic as a tool of civilian control (Brooks 1998). At some level they are inherently corrupting of the military institution, and the loyalty they buy may be allegiance to the bribe, not to the civilian institution doing the bribing.

A more noble version of incentive adjustments forms the heart of traditional civil-military relations theory: a social contract between civilians and the military enshrined in a "proper" division of labor. By this division of labor, the civilians structure a set of incentives for the military that rewards subordination with autonomy. Some division of labor is inevitable; indeed, the very term civil-military relations assumes that there is something called civilian and that it is different from the thing called military. However, as used here, the division of labor is more a normative than a descriptive concept. It derives from Clausewitz's (1976) principle that war is the continuation of politics by other means. This is what Clausewitz meant by the aphorism, "[War's] grammar, indeed, may be its own but not its logic." The logic of war must come from the political masters of the military.

Clausewitzean logic assigns a role for civilians and implies, in turn, a role for the military. The military are, in Clausewitzean phraseology, the grammarians of war. This makes operations the exclusive province of the military. The argument asserts that some issues are not political; that is, some issues are purely technical, best decided by the experts, in this case, the military.

This division of labor is implied in Huntington's (1957) preferred method of civilian control, "objective control." Objective control means maximizing the professionalism of the military; because obedience to civilians is at the heart of professionalism (Huntington claims), this will insure civilian control. Maximizing professionalism is best achieved by getting the military out of politics and, similarly, getting the politicians out of the military, that is, getting the politicians out of directing tactical and operational matters. Welch (1976) is even more explicit about the quid pro quo aspect of the division of labor. He advocates a hands-off approach as the most effective and achievable path to civilian control. Civilians grant autonomy to the military in matters of lesser import in exchange for military acceptance of the ethic of subordination. Such a deal was crucial, for instance, in preserving civilian control during the early French Republic; the

army was granted autonomy over accession policy (which the army exploited to limit commissions to the aristocracy and to Catholics) in exchange for a cult of obedience.

The disposition of the military to intervene can be reduced in yet another way—by strengthening the legitimacy of the civilian government (Holsti 1996). A vigorous and effective civilian government eliminates a powerful coup motive, namely the military conviction that they can rule better than incompetent or corrupt civilians. Such a government also makes insubordination and coups more costly because it raises the expectation that the mass civilian society will support the civilian leaders against the military.[7]

Finally, civilians can adopt numerous monitoring mechanisms, which, while not making insubordination impossible, nevertheless raise the costs and so may affect the military's disposition to intervene (P Feaver, unpublished manuscript). Monitoring mechanisms include such activities as audits, investigations, rules of engagement; civilian staffs with expertise and oversight responsibilities; and such extragovernmental institutions as the media and defense think tanks. Essentially, monitoring mechanisms enhance civilian control by bringing military conduct to the attention of responsible civilians. Monitoring mechanisms like this presume a certain level of civilian control—they are not going to secure civilian control in the face of a coup-prone military. They are essentially the practical implementation of the constitutional/legal provisions discussed above, suffering from the same limitations. Indeed, they may even be self-limiting; monitoring mechanisms can take the form of "getting in the military's knickers," provoking more harm in military resentment than benefit they gain in civilian oversight. Properly implemented, however, monitoring mechanisms can raise the costs of military insubordination or noncompliant behavior simply by making it more difficult for such action to go unnoticed.

The greater the willingness of civilian leaders to punish noncompliant behavior, the more effective the monitoring mechanisms are in securing civilian control. Yet, even with weak and uneven punishment, the monitoring mechanisms can support civilian control. Especially in the face of a global norm supporting democratic traditions, it always costs the military more to disobey in public than to do so in private. Although monitoring mechanisms may not ensure compliance in cases where military interests dictate large benefits from noncompliance, they can affect cost-benefit calculations at the margins. More to the point, they are the critical arena for civil-military relations in mature democracies. As the norm and the fact of civilian control become more deeply entrenched, the day-to-day practice of civil-military relations (and hence the focus of the study of civil-military relations) will increasingly center on monitoring and oversight of the delegation relationship. As the field shifts in this direction, however, care should be taken to make precise and sufficiently limited claims. Conclusively establishing which monitoring mechanisms are more effective than others—or identifying the conditions under which one kind of monitoring mechanism is superior to another—is notoriously difficult. Just as it is difficult to know whether deterrence is working, the absence of civil-military problems may be evidence for the effectiveness of the control mechanism or it may reflect the underlying stability of the political structure, or luck, or indeed all three factors.

AN AMERICAN RENAISSANCE

The casual observer might be surprised to learn that the civil-military problematique is the focus of renewed attention among scholars and observers of the American case. An outsider might assume that if any country has solved this problem, surely it must be the United States, which boasts unchallenged superpower status and a 200-plus–year record without a coup or attempted

coup. In fact, however, the question of the robustness and efficacy of civilian control in the United States is very much a live issue in policy-making circles, and this has precipitated a renewed interest in the academic subfield.

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, and well before President Clinton's much-discussed problems with the military became manifest, a number of scholars and analysts began to express concern about the health and direction of civil-military relations. The alarms were somewhat ironic because the peaceful end of the Cold War and the operational success of the coalition forces in the 1990–1991 Gulf War seemed to augur nothing but good things for the future of the national security establishment. Nevertheless, experts found things to worry about: an overly vigorous Joint Staff with a politically savvy Chairman who seems to dominate defense policy debates (Campbell 1991, Weigley 1993, Kohn 1994); a civilian society that overutilizes the military for missions that politicize the military and divert them from their primary war-fighting focus (Dunlap 1992/1993, 1994); a growing gap between the experiences, outlook, and ideology of the military and those of civilian society, especially civilian policy makers (Ricks 1997;, Holsti 1997;, Kohn & Bacevich 1997; Gibson & Snider 1998). Of course, the Clinton problem exacerbated these concerns in the form of an apparently weak and vacillating civilian leadership, personified by a president who had avoided military service and knew little about military affairs (Bacevich 1993, 1994/1995, Luttwak 1994, Owen 1994/1995, Lane 1995, Johnson & Metz 1995, Johnson 1996, Korb 1996).

The basic political questions of "who decides?" and "what should they decide?" played out in a variety of well-publicized policy fights and scandals: debates over whether or how to use force in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Rwanda; the debate over whether to allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military; the debate over whether to open combat duties to women; and the various sexual harassment and sexual peccadilloes scandals (charges of sexual harassment at the 1991 Tailhook Convention, allegations of sexual harassment at the Aberdeen training facility, the issue of Kelly Flinn's adultery and fraternization, the withdrawal of General Ralston's nomination for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after his own adulterous affair came to light, etc) (Snider & Carlton-Carew 1995).

The newsworthiness of American civil-military relations has naturally attracted the attention of a new generation of scholars, who, expressing frustration with the old Huntington and Janowitz theoretical frameworks, have offered a range of broad-gauged alternatives.

Avant (1994, 1996/1997, 1998) offers a principal-agent interpretation, contrasting divided-principal settings like the United States, where military agents have the opportunity to play civilian principals off of each other, with unified principal settings like Britain, where such opportunities are more limited. Militaries in the former setting are less likely to embrace civilian-led doctrinal innovations than are militaries under a unified principal. My own work (P Feaver, unpublished manuscript; 1998a) also draws on the principal-agent literature. I develop a deductively grounded model of civil-military relations as a game of strategic interaction between civilian principals, who must decide how intrusively to monitor the military, and military agents, who decide whether to work or shirk in light of the monitoring regime and exogenously determined expectations of punishment. Weiner (1995), Zegart (1996), Brooks (1999) also use the principal-agent approach to explore variations in how political-military institutions are formed and reformed. The framework has particular appeal because it is deductively grounded (and therefore able to generate parsimonious hypotheses) and because it nests the civil-military relationship within other political institutions and political relationships (and therefore offers

opportunities to link the issue of political control of the military to concerns about the political control of other institutions).

Desch (1998a, 1999) offers a structural theory that treats military compliance with civilian directives as a function of the configuration of external and internal threats confronting a state; in the US case, Desch argues, moving from the Cold War setting of a high-external/low-internal threat environment to a post–Cold War low/low environment eroded the external orientation of the American military and encouraged them to engage in internal political squabbles. Dauber (1998), coming from the field of communications studies, offers an interpretation of civil-military relations as a contest in which standards of argumentation—public, private, or expert—will dominate policy making. Schiff (1995) offers "concordance theory," which explains changes in military subordination as a function of different patterns of relations among the governmental elite, the mass public, and the military. In a rare example of competitive theory testing, a number of the different frameworks have been applied to a common case in the hope of clarifying the uses and limitations of each framework (Bacevich 1998, Burk 1998, Desch 1998b, Feaver 1998b).[8]

The recent work is distinctive for its explicit emphasis on theory building, theory testing, and building bridges to other debates within political science. The traditional emphasis in the civil-military relations subfield has been on rich description and inductive case studies. It has been ideographic rather than nomothetic in orientation. This has had the advantage of producing a body of common knowledge accessible to a variety of disciplines, including history, sociology, and area studies. It has had the disadvantage, however, of limiting the theoretical development of the subfield. In contrast, the new work has generated clear, falsifiable, and generalizable hypotheses grounded in a consistent deductive logic: Patterns of military compliance vary according to different configurations of internal and external threat; the costs of monitoring and prospects for punishment influence the way the military responds to civilian direction; divisions among principals make the military less responsive to innovation; and so on. It is too soon to know whether future research will reinforce or undermine these hypotheses and the broader theories from which they derive, but the focus on theory, rather than description, opens the door to the kind of cumulation expected in normal science. Moreover, the recent work offers the chance to integrate the subfield more profitably with the rest of political science. Much of the new work in civil-military relations makes use of concepts and methods common in other political science literatures (structural theory, the principal-agent framework, game theory, etc) and thereby enhances the possibility for fruitful interactions between those who study civil-military relations and those who study other political phenomena.

The newsworthiness has also generated at least three major collaborative research projects, involving scores of researchers from academia, the military, and the civilian policy arena. Harvard's Olin Institute sponsored a multiyear Project on US Post–Cold War Civil-Military Relations that resulted in some 30 books, articles, book chapters, and working papers. The Triangle Institute for Security Studies has a follow-on project, Bridging the Gap: Assuring Military Effectiveness When Military Culture Diverges from Civilian Society, that will produce several original surveys of civilian and military opinion as well as over 15 article-length analyses of the nature, origin, and significance of any differences or similarities between civilian and military cultures. The Center for Strategic and International Studies is conducting a companion study, American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century, that will explore how the traditions, values, customs, and leadership behaviors of the military influence military effectiveness. As the project titles suggest, one of the key points of emphasis for current research

is the role of culture (both military and civilian), the extent to which those cultural forms are immutable, and the ways in which they interact with the challenge of ensuring the need for protection from and by the military (Burk 1999).

CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

These separate but reinforcing investigations ensure that the American case will receive due attention. In the broader civil-military subfield, future research might profitably focus on at least three additional faultlines in the existing literature. One concerns whether measures targeting the ability of would-be military insubordinates are more effective than those targeting the disposition. The conventional answer is that measures aimed at reducing military leaders' ability to be insubordinate are inherently limited because they also leave a state more vulnerable to external threats. Thus, traditional theorists such as Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), Welch (1976) all emphasize various (and sometimes contradictory) measures aimed at the disposition of the military: professionalizing it and/or keeping it integrated with society, establishing social contracts that delineate spheres of influence, and so on. Recently, however, some political scientists have given greater weight to measures designed to check the ability of military organizations to intervene. As noted above, Frazer (1994) explicitly advocates that civilians establish competing institutions with coercive capabilities (such as separate paramilitary groups), which can serve as counterweights deterring military insubordination and/or compelling military compliance with civilian authorities. Likewise, Belkin (1998) concludes that all alternative strategies are inadequate and so a coup-prone state will perforce rely on these institutional counterweights, what he calls counterbalancing. This debate provides an interesting contrast with the trend elsewhere in political science. The fad in other subfields is the constructivist project, exploring ideational and norm-based explanations for political phenomena. The civil-military field has been dominated by ideational and norm-based explanations for 40 years, and some of the best new work is instead exploring the rationalist and interest-based aspects of civil-military relations. This debate also has obvious policy relevance, especially in transitioning democracies, where civilian control measures are still in their infancy. Thus far, these analyses have focused on coups, and so one priority is to apply the interest-based approach to the other dependent variables discussed in this essay.

A second faultline, also of great relevance to the vast democratization project, concerns whether to focus reforms on the civilian or on the military side of the relationship. Perlmutter (1977:281) concludes that a "stable, sustaining, and institutionalized political regime can hardly succumb to military pressure and rule," whereas no degree of professionalism can be counted on to guarantee military compliance in the face of the utter collapse of the civilian regime. By implication, any effort to improve civilian control must focus on improving the civilian side of the house. Stepan (1988), although not necessarily sympathetic to Perlmutter's approach, nevertheless pursues the civilian-side agenda even further. He argues for the strengthening of civilian military expertise by creating independent think tanks and stronger permanent committees in the parliament with routinized oversight responsibilities and sufficient staff to carry them out.

Welch (1976), in contrast, emphasizes efforts aimed at the military institution itself. Although he concedes that civilian legitimacy is important, he argues that efforts to improve civilian legitimacy (what he calls Strategy 1) are doomed by forces well beyond the control of most states: the vitality of the economy, the dominant social cleavages, and the general weakness of civilian institutions. Hence, Welch favors Strategy 2, tailoring the boundaries, mission, values, organization, recruitment, and socialization of the military so as to foster "a mutual sense of

political restraint on the part of officers and politicians alike" (1976:317). The debate so far has taken the form of dueling anecdotes and competing laundry lists, however, and the field would greatly benefit from carefully specified theory testing. Special emphasis should be placed on identifying the conditions under which civilian-based or military-based reforms are more fruitful, and, if both are pursued simultaneously, the circumstances under which one set of reforms can undermine efforts in the other area.

A third faultline concerns the other side of the problematique, the linkage between patterns of civil-military relations and military effectiveness (Biddle & Zirkle 1996). Most American military officers accept as an article of faith the general Huntingtonian assertion that respect for military autonomy is necessary for military effectiveness, but it has never been established through rigorous empirical testing. It relies on anecdotes, like the botched Iranian hostage rescue mission, and myths, like the belief that President Johnson's micromanagement of the bombing campaigns prevented air power from deciding the Vietnam War (this myth has been rather convincingly rebutted in Pape 1996). A priority for future research would be to subject this and related claims to serious empirical study. Does civilian meddling uniformly result in disaster, or is such assertive control conducive to better strategy and operations under certain conditions?

Likewise, scholars should explore more fully the linkages between patterns of civil-military relations and the propensity to use force. The linkage has been investigated in the case of World War I (Van Evera 1984, Snyder 1984), especially the possibility that inadequate civilian control let military strategists push Germany and France into adopting inappropriately offense-oriented doctrines. The existing political science literature, however, is not very sophisticated in its understanding of civil-military relations. It tends to treat civil-military relations as a dichotomous variable—civilians in control/not in control—and does not explore the different causal effects of other forms of societal-military relations. For instance, is a country more prone to use force if it has an all-volunteer army, which can be deployed almost as mercenary force, or does the existence of mass-based conscription constrain leaders to follow swings in public opinion rather than the more prudent dictates of raison d'état? What if civilian decision makers increasingly come to positions of power without any personal experience with the military? Will they be ignorant of the limits of military power and prone to use the military in inappropriate ways or under unnecessarily dangerous circumstances? Or will they be overly sensitive to casualties, fearful that they lack the moral authority to order other men into danger, and thereby underutilize force when its application is called for? And if strategists are correct about a coming revolutionary change in war and military practice occasioned by the integration of advanced information technology into the armed forces, what does this portend for the way civilian decision makers control military institutions and for the way the armed forces relate to society?

Finally, I argue that one longstanding line of inquiry is not fruitful and should be abandoned: the linkage between professionalism and military subordination to civilian control. Huntington (1957) inaugurated this line of study with his argument that professionalism was the key to civilian control. But he included in his definition of professionalism acceptance of the ethic of subordination, so his argument (at least on this point) was in some sense tautological and defined away the problem. For this he has been roundly criticized (Finer 1962, Abrahamsson 1972). Janowitz (1960), however, did much the same thing, hinging political control on "professional ethics," and has received much less criticism for it (Abrahamsson 1972, Larson 1974). In my view, the analytical utility of the umbrella concept has been exhausted, and it now serves to obscure interesting debates—for instance, whether rational-interest factors are more influential than values-based factors in determining military behavior—rather than to illuminate them.

Future research should focus on teasing out the explanatory force of the different component factors of what has been called professionalism and leave the synthetic concept at the rhetorical level, where it belongs. Sociologists have already embraced this approach, tracing changes in the nature of professionalism with the switch from draft-based service, which produced a traditional or "institutional" model of service, to an all-volunteer form of ascription, which produced an "occupational" model of service (Moskos 1977, Segal 1986, Moskos & Wood 1988).

The foregoing underscores the relatively weak cumulation in the political science theory of civil-military relations. The field has simply not produced a large body of consensus findings that enjoy widespread support and that would apply with equal force to a wide range of countries. Part of the problem may be an epistemological one that bedevils all of political science, the problem of self-negating predictions. Unlike electrons and atoms, the subjects of political science are themselves volitional actors. It makes sense for physicists to assume that particles are simply reacting to forces affecting them. The subjects of political science theory, however, are acting, reacting, and counteracting. And just as physics has its Heisenberg principle, which acknowledges the confounding influence of human measurement, so too does political science, but at an even more fundamental level.

Civil-military theorists must recognize that our subjects are thinking about the same problems, perhaps drawing similar conclusions about cause-effect relationships, and adjusting their behavior accordingly. Even a sensible policy prescription based on a reliable prediction that is itself based on a robust theory of cause and effect can be wrong if the political players understand the process and adjust their behavior successfully. Thus, seemingly weak civilian governments can compensate for their weakness to preserve civilian control, just as seemingly weak military actors can compensate to threaten even an apparently stable civilian regime. In short, even the best political science will offer only tentative predictions and qualified assessments.

Yet, the literature could be stronger than it is. The literature offers a rich resource of civil-military case studies but relatively few rigorous attempts to test hypotheses against these data. The sophistication and methodological self-awareness of the more recent studies augurs well in this regard, however. And the confluence of two trends in the real world—the spread of democracies and the remarkable disharmony within America's political and military elite—has made the study of civil-military relations more interesting and more salient than at any time since the end of the Vietnam War.

3hrs
Approaches to understand Civil-Military Relations

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations

This book was partly provoked by the firing of General Douglas MacArthur by President Harry Truman in the Korean War. The event inspired him to explore the civil–military relations in a liberal democratic society. Before, as civil–military relations are expected to be compatible with American liberalism, people used to endorse liberal idea of subjective civilian control that requires the military to involve in institutional politics, thus military's autonomy is legally and institutionally restricted. However, Huntington, in this book, argues for the theory of objective

civilian control, which stresses "autonomous military professionalism" (Huntington, 1957: 83), and endorses conservatives, anti-individualistic ethos. While civilian officials make decision on policies, we should let military to have autonomy in all technical, professional matters, so that the military can work out the means to execute the policies. Huntington thinks that professionalizing military can best serve the security of American nation, instead of democratic force.

Huntington first provides a historical and theoretical analysis of officership as a profession, and argues that the expertise of the military officer is "the management of violence" (Huntington, 1957: 11). Liberalism believes in individualism, have faith in human capacity for advancement, and distrusts in power and military. For Huntington, such a view is too optimistic. Conservative realism rather believes "the permanence, irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature" (Huntington, 1957: 79). The origin of violence lies in selfishness and weakness of human nature that can only be controlled by "organization, discipline, and leadership" (Huntington, 1957: 63). Military ethics stresses the importance of order and power in sustaining state security. It emphasizes the priority of community over individual, as individuals can only realize themselves by participating in the great continuing organic body. Thus, "[t]he military ethic is basically corporative in spirit" (Huntington, 1957: 64). Then, Huntington argues that the practice of soldier is a professional matter. An efficient society should leave room to soldiers to cultivate their professional abilities and have their own professional ethic. He reviews the prevalence of liberalism and the arduous development of the professionalism in the history of America from 1789 to World War II (WWII). He shows that the constant suspicion of professionalism by liberalism that had repeatedly attempted to 'enlighten' the soldiers, and thus reducing the efficiency of the military, which indeed threatens the security of the nation.

Finally, Huntington explores the civil–military relations during and after the WWII. In his analysis of the political roles of the Joint Chiefs and the Department of Defense, Huntington points out that the shortcomings of these institutions lie in the liberal ideology, which makes people to be unrealistic in thinking about war. Huntington, therefore, urges to abandon liberalism for military professionalism that is required in the coming age. The book is ended by adoring the elite military college at West Point.

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Militarism

Anna Stavrianakis, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Militarism as Excessive Influence

A fourth definition is of militarism as the excessive influence of either the institution of the state military or of the MIC. The former is characteristic of a civil–military relations approach, of which there are various strands. These include a US-focused literature on the rise of a standing army post-WWII (e.g., Lasswell, 1950; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960); and the Cold War concern with the role of the military as a potential modernizing force in so-called 'new nations'

(e.g., Huntington, 1968; Janowitz, 1977; Pye, 1962). The literature on the developing world initially mostly focused on coups, but later shifted to a broader spectrum of military influence, because of the observation that the military can be powerful even if it does not seize power directly.

There is debate as to whether it is the characteristics of the military itself, or society, that are the more important variable in understanding militarism. However, the civil–military relations approach as a whole rests on the problematic idea of an 'equation,' with the military on one side and civilian institutions and procedures on the other (Valenzuela, 1985). But the civilian side is not just another institution; the military is an actor within a social and political system, not a neutral force outside its boundaries. The two 'sides' are thus highly interpenetrated. Civil–military relations discussions of militarism – in which militarism occurs when the 'balance' tilts too far in favor of the military – are thus limited by a conceptual separation between military and society that obscures the grounding of military power in social relations.

Literature on the MIC starts to overcome this pluralist separation between the military and civilian institutions, focusing instead on the shared interests between the military, military industry, top-level government bureaucrats, and legislators and the influence they exercise on society as a whole. This type of approach is more focused on the socioeconomic dimensions of militarism, as compared to the institutional approach of the civil–military relations literature. There are a variety of theoretical perspectives in play, but the result of these relationships is variously characterized as coordinated and mutually supportive influence that creates a shared interest in continued military spending (Rosen, 1973: 2–3), "a set of commonly shared interests between the military and some major corporations" (Lieberson, 1973: 61), and a "self-serving accommodation between corporate elites, government bureaucrats, and the military hierarchy" (Moskos, 1972: 4).

The civil–military relations and MIC approaches are both useful ways in two particular aspects of militarism – the institutional and the political-economic. But the focus on either institutions or economic relations cannot adequately explain militarism in its broader sense of the preparation for and conduct of organized political violence. In addition, both approaches tend to be nationally based in their explanations. MIC accounts are useful for thinking about the political economy of militarism, and thus start to ground militarism in social relations (e.g., between arms companies, politicians, and the military); but usually remain focused on national economies, which is problematic given the internationalization of military industry. And civil–military relations approaches have tended to assume a sovereign nation-state, which is problematic given the internationalization of military power through alliances, foreign military training, arms transfers, and so on. These processes challenge the basic assumption that the key explanatory variables (military and domestic political process) are located within national societies (Valenzuela, 1985).

Warfare and Military Studies, Overview

The Future

Future research into warfare and military studies will undoubtedly be framed by the same debates as in the past, because no clear or universally accepted answers have been found. Thus research continues to search for answers to the same questions: should the military be an autonomous organization or one subjected to civilian control, should military service be an

obligation of citizenship or one of many voluntary choices available to potential members; and should the primary mission of a military be winning wars or maintaining peace? The difference in prospective studies will be the emphasis on global rather than national, regional, or international concerns. This will necessitate the use of multinational forces and raises questions about from where the command of such forces will emanate. Furthermore, the inclusion of individuals from different cultures and socioeconomic backgrounds will mean that the legitimacy of any military operation must be established from an inclusionary rather than an isolationist perspective. All of these derive from a principal that peace and security cannot be attained by individual nations but must be global in orientation. Unilateral military actions will not make a nation or its citizens secure from war or from other terrorist acts.

For many individuals, current levels of terrorism have become a primary basis for sustaining a strong military force. The idea is that terrorism has become too enormous a problem for the state to handle using civil means. Thus military force is used to replace or to augment the use of civilian police forces. In many countries, such as those in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe, the use of the military in a police role is strongly resisted. In these countries, the use of military power to control domestic problems has been associated with *coup d'etat*, civil war, and repression. Some have argued that the status and role of the soldier is too focused on war to be a viable role for the needs of a multinational world with ever-changing allegiances. Soldiers themselves seem to object to the idea of their being utilized as peacekeepers. Turning to a required national service orientation could alleviate the concerns about the peacekeeping roles of soldiers as well as the complete integration of race, ethnic, and sexual minorities as well as women.

In the more distant future, the role of the military may become even more international and dependent on cooperation rather than military force. For the moment we are still able to confine our thinking about civil–military relations and warfare and military studies to the Earth as we know it. Given rapid technological and communication advances, that may last for only a short duration. In a 1997 editorial General Howell M. Estes III wrote:

The US military is already heavily dependent on space for support in five areas: navigation, communication, weather, warning and intelligence. In my opinion, the military's dependence on space will only grow in the years ahead.

Very soon, in order to remain an important arena for research, rather than a world perspective, peace and military studies will have to incorporate the important aspects of the past as well as the lessons we learn [now] as we begin explorations into the universe.

Military, War, and Politics

The Victory of Democratic Control over the Military and War

This is the dark empirical background against which the seminal modern contributions of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s to the analysis of the relationship between military and politics and war and politics should be situated. Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1957) and Morris Janowitz (Janowitz, 1960) put forward theories on the forms of civil–military relations which most effectively protected against foreign threats without endangering democracy at home. Morton Halperin (Halperin, 1974) and Graham T. Allison (Allison, 1971) analyzed the bureaucratic politics of self-serving government agencies with a view to identifying the best ways of assuring

effective policy process. Bernard Brodie and Thomas Schelling worried about nuclear escalation and sought to develop effective strategies of conflict (Freedman, 2003). Alfred Vagts (Vagts, 1959) and Gerhard Ritter (Ritter, 1954–1968), with pertinent personal experience of recent German history, provided historical accounts of the phenomenon of militarism (Berghahn, 1984). To this list of influential authors, one should also add Clausewitz. In the highly successful 1976 English translation of *On War* by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Clausewitz's work emerged as the seminal text on war as a political instrument (Honig, 2007).

This body of literature was overwhelmingly normatively based. In contrast to the earlier writings on total war, it did not overtly question the desirability of a democratic political order, nor refrain from expressing an abhorrence of war. It also accepted that war possessed a unique and unchanging nature and that the military domain constituted a special sphere of activity, distinct from the civilian and the political. The association of war with escalation fueled fears that nuclear war could perhaps not be managed. For all the assiduous application of novel and imaginative social scientific methods, the literature struggled to arrive at clear and indisputable findings on how the relationship between (nuclear) war, military, and politics was best managed. While a social scientific consensus proved elusive, a normative consensus emerged that war was better avoided altogether and that it was the role of prudent government policy to promote this.

The military's main role settled on acting as a deterrent. This put the military in a clearly subservient position which, pacified with relatively generous defense budgets and relatively independent management, it on the whole accepted. The growing destructiveness of weapons technology diminished the need for vast armies of conscripts. So the move away from manpower-intensive to technology-intensive war preparation, underpinned ultimately by a relatively cheap nuclear weapons inventory, made the demand for total mobilization redundant. Constitutional pressures thus abated and civil–military relations could to all appearance be adequately managed by the prevailing structures of civilian ministerial oversight and parliamentary budget control.

Preparation for war did not overwhelm the state and its democratic-capitalist order. The needs of modern, technology-intensive war, on the contrary, emphasized the importance of creating a select, specialist profession of 'managers of violence' (in Huntington's subtle adaptation of Lasswell's phrase). Even the instances in which the military were used – Vietnam being the most prominent case in point – it did not threaten the primacy of democratic political control. Despite the emergence of an influential narrative that the Vietnam War was lost as the result of a failure by the political leadership to define clear objectives and accept military professional demands to follow through the logic of war by escalating to success, defeat was an understandable outcome justified by the overall political context which carried the risk of a local war escalating into a global nuclear holocaust. Studies noted that, with respect to the administration of US civil–military relations during Vietnam, 'the system worked' (Gelb and Betts, 1979) and that the military were generally much more cautious than their political leaders about committing to the use of force (Betts, 1977).

Some concern persisted about the self-serving inclinations of military bureaucracies and there was an extensive debate in 1980s about the allegedly pre-emptive and offensive preferences of military-professional organizations (Miller et al., 1991). Official US policy statements also indicated that the military continued to prefer strategies that emphasized a speedy use of overwhelming force (the 1984 Weinberger and 1991 Powell doctrines). By the end of the Cold War, a strong confidence had nonetheless set in that 'mature democracy' had overcome the

traditional challenges the military posed to politics. The apparent success of a particular stage in Western political development was further underlined by the contrast with the developing, 'third' world countries where military coups appeared an endemic problem. And even in the 'second,' communist world the totalitarian system seemed to creak and crack at the seams because of the social and financial burden imposed by maintaining a totalitarian system that was locked in an exhaustive arms race with the capitalist West.

Military Sociology

Civil–Military Relations and Citizenship

Scholars in the mid-twentieth century attempted to describe the structural relationships between modern military forces and their host societies. Among the most important of these were Mills's (1956) *The Power Elite* and Lasswell's model of *The Garrison State*. Issues of the relationship between the military, the state, and society became even more of a concern following World War II. Civil–military relations continued to hold a place on the sociological agenda, even as the research focus returned to the enlisted soldier. Involvement through participation in militia units, mobilization and conscription, and a linkage between military service and citizenship had been an expectation of male citizens since the American and French Revolutions (Kestnbaum, 2002). In the United States, perceptions of inequality in the conscription process that placed the burdens of fighting the Vietnam War disproportionately on the poor drove a debate on ending conscription and manning the military force with volunteers. Economists held a central position in the discussion of whether labor market dynamics could replace conscription in meeting the manpower needs of the Cold War military. The decision was made and the 1972 defense appropriation provided funds for the establishment of an all-volunteer military force. The United States announced the end of peacetime conscription for the first time since World War II in January 1973.

As they had during World War II, the U.S. armed forces conducted and funded behavioral science research to support the challenge of maintaining a large standing force with volunteers. Although the service research units had emphasized psychology and the measurement of aptitudes since World War II, they reincorporated sociology and the study of attitudes. Military sociology grew as the military research units funded research in-house and at universities.

Structural Dimensions

Introduction

Consistent with the late Samuel Huntington's separatist thesis in *The Soldier and the State*, the "military professional" is one who pursues expertise in combat in service to a country's or society's defense. In this separatist view, such service does not require the solider to be fully integrated with civil society (Huntington, 1957). Professional soldiers in a democratic society also have as part of their organizational ethos a strong disinclination to intervene in politics. Indeed, one finds professional militaries in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere imbued with this separatist, professional ethic but at the same time committed as professionals to respecting Constitutional government, institutions, and political processes.

On the other hand, the logic of the late Morris Janowitz's integrationist thesis in *The Professional Soldier* is compelling (Janowitz, 1960). Maintaining a positive balance in civil–military relations

that supports democratic institutions and processes is never automatic, even in countries with long-standing traditions against military intervention in politics. It is a problem that requires continuing attention at any time and is an ongoing challenge for policymakers who seek to prevent the isolation of military establishments.

Are separatist norms against intervention in politics sufficient to dissuade military establishments from intervening against political authorities, not just when things are going well, but also in times of adversity? From this more skeptical perspective, the norms internalized by military professionals are important, but not enough. Greatest assurance occurs when these professionals are fully a part of their societies. They are the "citizens" who just happen to be in uniform.

Establishing this concept of professionalism that eschews intervention in politics has proven to be particularly problematic in newly industrializing and economically less-developed societies in which the military is oftentimes one of the strongest institutions. The problem is exacerbated in those societies in which the armed forces not only have an established historical pattern of political intervention, but also see this as a legitimate role as self-proclaimed protectors of society, its culture, and even its Constitution.

When in power, civilian leadership elites in these countries often do not attempt to integrate these military elements within society, preferring to buy off, marginalize, or relegate them to the sidelines rather than make them a viable part of the societal mainstream. As the historical record shows, this approach runs a very real risk that civil society will yet again become victim to military coup (or *golpe* as the phenomenon is known in many Latin American countries).

By contrast, the Swiss and Swedish approach is to integrate soldiers and society as fully as practicable for their military purpose. A relatively small number of full-time professionals are complemented by trained reservists drawn from those able to serve within the society.

A post-Cold War Swiss referendum overwhelmingly supported keeping universal military service requirement for males. After moving from universal to an all-volunteer service model, the Swedes reimposed a selective-service draft of both men and women to meet military personnel requirements. Alternative-service provisions exist for conscientious objectors to military service. Given the large citizen presence in both Switzerland and Sweden, one is hard pressed to draw any meaningful distinction between the citizen and the soldier. In such societies, it is difficult to imagine how the military would intervene in politics or be a threat to society since they are already so much a part of it as individuals in their daily lives. Military service for such "citizen soldiers" is just one more additional duty or responsibility that goes with citizenship in a civil society.

Conscription Policy

Conscription and Citizenship

The institutions of conscription extend the state's social control of its people, but they can also lay the basis for the extension of citizenship. The exploration of the citizen-soldier has been the subject of considerable discussion, most notably in the work of Morris Janowitz, Samuel Stouffer, Charles Moskos, Elliot Cohen, and David Segal, but that literature has largely investigated civil–military relations and the motivations of soldiers to fight. Of more interest here

is the ways in which the development of conscription interacts with the construction of the terms of citizenship.

Within the context of modern nationalism, someone who is willing to die for one's country has a claim on recognition as a full citizen of that country. Historically, conscription is often linked with demands for the franchise, social services, and other rights of citizenship. There is considerable evidence that ethnic minorities who have been exempted from conscription will become eager volunteers in order to demonstrate their loyalty and thus earn the privilege of eligibility for conscription. This may explain why so many blacks and Nisei Japanese enthusiastically signed up for United States Army during World War II, why some Druse are so eager to participate in the Israeli army, and why other notable ethnic minorities have also enlisted in their country's armies (Petersen 1989).

In France, Switzerland, several other continental European countries, and for many Israelis, citizenship, at least male citizenship, is closely tied to one's service as a conscript. There is an expectation of some form of conscription, even during peacetime. It is a rite of passage to have served in the military, and it is often a form of bonding for the cohort that drills together. The Anglo-Saxon democracies of Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have a quite different tradition. Until World War I, conscription could be imposed only during war and, moreover, only during a war of defense—although the definition of 'war of defense' varies among these countries and among groups within these countries. Nearly all have had some extended period of conscription in the absence of major military conflagrations, but the draft remains controversial.

Conscription by democratic governments seems to succeed to the extent the policymakers design military service formats that, first, ensure relative equality of sacrifice and, second, provide a means for popular discussion and approval of the war and conscription policy. More often than not these more democratic moves are accomplished not through foresight but as revision of failed policies. With few exceptions, policymakers first introduced conscription that provided discriminatory exemptions to powerful constituents and laid nearly the whole burden of warfare on those without the franchise or other form of political clout. Such policies changed only in response to legislative conflict, political protests, and actual draft riots, such as those in New York in 1863 or in Toulouse in 1868. These acts compelled policymakers to revise their beliefs about the acceptability of permitting some part of the population to literally buy their way out of military service.

The high degree of citizen support necessary for conscription hinges on the perception of an acceptable policy bargain whose terms government actors are likely to uphold. The minimal terms of the democratic conscription bargain are that government will conscript according to some legislated and relatively equitable formula.

The history of conscription in France throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century is one of ongoing negotiations between citizens and state officials over what makes for equitable rules governing conscription. Conscription was by lottery; a set number was chosen from the pool of eligible young men and constituted the cohort of that year. The registrars only went down the list if some of those chosen did not pass the medical examination. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, hiring a substitute was an acceptable practice. Indeed, many of those who received a 'bad' number in the lottery found substitution Pareto optimal. The unlucky recruit was generally covered by an insurance scheme his parents had bought and which provided the

resources to pay the bonus or premium substitutes demanded. No one became newly eligible as a result, and young men accepted the substitution contract only if they found it sufficiently attractive—they were not compelled to serve. However, as France increasingly democratized and as the concept of equity altered in consequence, substitution was increasingly considered undemocratic and unfair.

In contrast, voluntary citizen soldiers had been the mark of the military format of the Anglo-Saxon democracies. The institution of conscription in Britain, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand during World War I represented a redesign of the democratic state and a redefinition of the obligations of citizenship. The Great War demonstrated the problems with voluntarism. It failed to produce enough enlistees or permit efficient mobilization of their labor. It led to unattractive and often inappropriate forms of moral suasion. It created bureaucratic mechanisms, such as the national registers, that may have discouraged as many volunteers as they encouraged. By publicizing the shortages in manpower, these censuses made evident the numbers who might be considered 'shirkers.' Such knowledge could make those who had enlisted as well as those who had not think twice about volunteering. If there were not to be enough men anyway, why make the sacrifice?

As states became more democratic, the relationship between conscription and citizenship changed. Conscription remained a basis for the demand for the vote and for social benefits, but it also came under more scrutiny as an obligation governments could impose, even in wartime. With increasing democratization came increasing questions of citizen approval of the wars being fought and the nature of the conscription system being imposed.

Wars among Nation-States: Patterns and Causes

The State at War

The concept of the state is often used in at least three conceptually distinct, but theoretically interlinked ways in relation to war: as an organizational-institutional entity; as a sociohistorical configuration; and as a legal entity. Although the definitions flowing from these three approaches are partly overlapping, they do not do so perfectly. Let us see successively these three approaches to the state.

First, when approached as an institutional-organizational concept, the state is often equated with the government and seen as a more or less unitary actor. We hence say the "state has decided…" when the notion of government would be more precise. When identifying the state with the government, one is in fact positing that the state is an institutionalized web of power relations that, at least in international relations, would function as a compact unit headed by the government and differentiated from society. With regards to war powers, the state is then often seen as a political command structure allowing its government to unilaterally impose its decisions on a bureaucracy and military chain of command while avoiding personal rule and societal interference. Whereas political sociologist J.P. Nettl bought into this narrative in 1968, he simultaneously recognized that one has to think of the state as a conceptual variable with different levels of 'stateness' from country to country in domestic affairs (Nettl, 1968). He however thought states to be exempt from such variability in their external relations. His domestic/ international distinction can however not be taken for granted. Not only can different Western states not be considered as invariants from the point of view of interstate war, but also the spread of the modern state beyond the West after decolonization introduced further variation

in its empirical forms. As a result, interstate war has become an even more heterogeneous phenomenon varying with the degree of institutionalization, societal interference, or civil–military relations of its protagonists. Hence, while the state as institution was traditionally seen, in war, to imply the allegiance of the population to the government and the former's exclusion from a participation unmediated by the latter, this supposition is increasingly dubious. It is equally noteworthy that most post-1990 interstate wars between neighbors have involved states often described as 'weak' or 'fragile': the Eritrean–Ethiopian War (1998–2000); the South Sudan–Sudan border war (2012); to a lesser extent the Cenepa War between Ecuador and Peru (1995); the Kargil War between India and Pakistan (1999), etc. This highlights the extent to which contemporary interstate wars often occur between states that do not comply with normative definitions of what they are supposed to be.

Secondly, as a sociohistorical configuration, the state is usually defined, following Weber, as a human community or 'institutional association of rule' the governing staff of which successfully claims a monopoly on legitimate violence on a given territory. In this sense, the criterion of statehood lies in the type of organization of violence and social configuration that the government is seen to uphold. Weber's definition is however flexible: it does not involve a monopoly on violence, but the successful claim (and there can be varying degrees of success) to a monopoly on specifically legitimate violence. However, when the infighting between rival armed groups for the violent control over a territory is endemic, durable, and enjoys varying degrees of support, one probably is beyond the reach of this flexibility. It is hence dubious whether there was a Congolese state in this sociohistorical sense during the Congo War II (1998–2003) during which its government was, among others, fighting at least indirectly against other governments (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi) through diverse proxies.

In Weberian historical sociology, the state is seen as being relatively pacified domestically and generally war-prone externally: the occurrence of civil violence and the capacity of states to wage interstate war are seen as inversely proportional. Indeed, the advent of the state in this sense is linked to the ability of increasingly centralized and bureaucratized power structures to impose a pacified order inside, thus becoming more capable of waging war outside: wars become, at least potentially (but often also actually), more intense and lethal. Interestingly, however, interstate wars become simultaneously less frequent. There is a long-term decline in the number interstate wars since the beginning of eighteenth century and since 1945 they have disappeared from the relations between Western states. The ambiguity between state formation as a process of domestic pacification and as potentially pushing war toward its extremes, both occurring through the increased centralization and bureaucratization of coercion within the state, indeed affects interstate relations as well. States manage to impose order, not only internally, but also on their relations as well, including a stricter separation between war and peace and a lesser chance of nonmilitarized disputes degenerating into full-scale interstate war (Mueller, 2004: 30). It is therefore only an apparent paradox that many of the contemporary interstate wars, rather than being solely triggered by the increase in the capabilities of their protagonists, are in fact linked to the inability, at least on the part of one of them, to control all sustained organized violence on their territory or emanating from it. The US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the Russia–Georgia War are cases in point.

The post-1945 world sheds light on the sociological-historical definition of the state in interesting ways. On the one hand, the outlawing of war (save in exceptional circumstances) by the UN charter further bureaucratizes interstate warfare by submitting it to rational-legal procedures at domestic and multilateral levels (Rasmussen, 2007). On the other hand, there is an

increased integration and internationalization of military affairs within organizations such as NATO and other "international 'conglomerates' of state-power" (Shaw, 2002: 89). This effectively limits the concerned governments' autonomy of decision and ability to wage war on their own. It raises the question whether the member states of these 'conglomerates,' in particular in the West, have not in fact pooled their 'monopolies of violence.' In this sense, there are good reasons to believe that dynamics has linked to the internationalization of military organizations account for the absence of interstate wars between Western states since 1945 at least as much as economic interdependencies or common identities (from which they are inseparable).

Thirdly, from an international law perspective, the state as a legal entity supposes the combination of an effective legal government, a population and a territory. Interstate war, as generally understood, however, implies war against governmental forces and hence a recognition of government as distinct from recognition of statehood. Consequently, interstate war increasingly is denied in political discourse by denying the quality of governmental forces (often by using the notion of regime) to the enemy. For example, Bush Jr. implied that the US was not at war with the Afghan state in 2001 since it was merely trying to destroy its purportedly illegitimate 'regime,' while fighting alongside president in exile Rabanni of the Northern alliance. A similar argument was used during the NATO war in Libya. Typically, political justifications of such denials would contest the legality and/or effectiveness of what might previously have been seen as the government or what others might see as the government. What is at the crux of the matter is that, as previously seen, the UN charter is understood to have outlawed interstate war (save in exceptional circumstances) and the type of objectives that these wars historically have been associated with: territorial expansion. The resulting negative connotation of interstate war implies that it has to be denied when waged.

As shown by what precedes, the meaning of "interstate war" is not devoid of ambiguities, amongst others because the concept of the state is itself polysemic. It therefore needs to be specified, shall it be used rigorously. We will here approach interstate war as a form of organized violence between governments claiming a monopoly on legitimate violence, usually (but not always) with success, on a given territory. We will use the concept of 'stateness' to account for different levels of institutionalization and monopolization of the state thus defined.

General Issues in Civil Military Relations

Most flag and general military officers participate in civil- military relations (CMR) daily whether or not they realize it. Yet while these leaders recognize and support the principle of civilian control, they have thought little over time about how it works or the difficulties involved, much less the larger framework of civil- military relations. Likewise, civilian leaders in the national security establishment, whether career civil servants or political appointees, contribute—for good or for ill—to American civil- military relations. They seem to think about CMR even less. This article analyzes the two broad categories of interaction that compose CMR using several discrete topics within each area. The article highlights the paradox in CMR and the best practices that previous generations of leaders expe-rienced and learned in navigating CMR issues successfully. ***** Upon commissioning into the US armed forces, every military officer swears to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. Upon promotion, all officers repeat that oath, again committing their loyalty and, if necessary, their lives to a system of government that at its foundation is based on civilian control of the military. While those words do not appear in the Constitution, the structure of the government, the powers assigned to each branch, the limitations

on those powers, and the many individual provisions, authorities, and responsibilities put the military—active duty and reserves—under the control of civilian officials atop the chain of command. Those civilian authorities are defined by laws duly passed under constitutional procedures. Thus, civilian control is the defining principle of the relationship but not the sum total of civil- military relations, as senior leaders quickly discover.

General Issues in Civil-Military Relations

Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn Civil- military relations is a broad subject encompassing diverse issues and innumerable topics. It includes the legal foundations for the use of force and the psychological processes that turn ordinary citizens into fighters. It also encompasses ethical conundrums regarding professional obligations in a hierarchy that asks individuals to risk their lives and how press statements by senior military officers affect public opinion.1 Military leaders must understand the fundamentals of the civil- military relationship in order to fulfill their duty as custodians of the nation's defense and the military profession. They can develop a stronger understanding of this relationship by appreciating two broad sets of dealings. The first is civil-military interactions in making policy and executing strategy at the senior- most levels of government. The second is civil- military interactions across societies, from the individual and group to military and civilian institutions. Each of these sets of interactions contains discrete topics that all senior military leaders can expect to confront at some point in their professional careers. And each has a paradox that frames relations between the civilian and military spheres in the United States today. Civil- Military Relations for Setting Policy and Strategy Since the founding of the republic under the Constitution, the United States has enjoyed an enviable and unbroken record of civilian control of the military. When measured by the traditional extreme of civil- military relations—a coup- d'état—there has never been a successful coup or even a serious coup attempt in the US. Academics and pundits may debate whether the violence at the Capitol on 6 January 2021 met a definition of "attempted coup." However, in the terms that most concerned the Framers of the Constitution and that have dominated American civil- military relations ever since, those attacks—horrible as they were—in no way fit the definition of a coup. That is, military leaders were not using military units under their command to attempt to seize political power. There is much to criticize about whether the military prepared adequately or adapted quickly to the unfolding events. Certainly, a few veterans and reservists took part in the violence, much to their shame and dishonor. But it was not an attempted seizure of political power by the military. America's record of unbroken civilian control stands if measured by the absence of coups. Nonetheless, since the United States has become a global superpower, almost every secretary of defense from James Forrestal to today (with the possible exception of President Trump's defense secretaries, as discussed below) has come into power with concerns that civil-military relations under his predecessor got out of balance, with the military gaining too much influence. Hence, the paradox is this: the unbroken record of civilian control and the nearly unbroken record of worry about civilian control. There are many reasons for this paradox, beginning with the simple fact that the military establishment in the superpower era has enjoyed remarkable power—in fiscal, political, and prestige terms—far in excess of what the Framers of the Constitution would have thought was proper or safe for the preservation of a free republic.2 Such power may be necessary to meet the constellation of threats but poses a latent threat of its own. Political leaders naturally and rightly fret about this concern in an "ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" sort of way.3 It is also true that the regular turnover of administrations, sometimes involving a change in the party in control, brings with it doubt about the reliability of current senior civil and uniformed officials. We think the root of the paradox lies in the differing worlds, experiences, and priorities exacerbated by the contradictory expectations civilian and

military leaders bring to the relationship. Since the participants from the two realms do not share expectations, each ends up disappointing and disturbing the other. Leaders are a bit like a newlywed couple, each spouse having some idea of what his or her own—and their partner's— role in the relationship would be. Unfortunately, if the spouses do not share the same role expectations, each is surprised to discover that the other keeps getting it "wrong" by behaving in unexpected ways.4 American military officers enter the relationship with a view of "proper" civil-military relations derived from the classic argument laid out by Samuel P.Huntington in the mid-1950s. His Soldier and the State proposes a relatively clean division of responsibility. Civilians should properly determine policy and grand strategy matters with advice from the military. The military should decide on issues largely centering on weapons, operations, and tactics according to the dictates of war, experience, and professional expertise.5 In Huntington's view, the military voluntarily subordinates itself to civilian direction in exchange for civilians respecting this division of responsibility. Civilians decide the weighty matter of who to fight and when, how much military budgets will be, what weapons will be purchased, and what policies will govern the military. They then give the military autonomy on the implementation of how to fight and how to execute civilian decisions. As one experienced journalist explained to us, "Civilians tell us where they want to go but leave the driving to us." Huntington's real genius was in describing an approach that already aligned with a traditional military point of view. His argument is still taught in professional military education as the "normal" theory of civil- military relations, leaving attentive officers to assume that this is the approved model.6 Nevertheless, few civilian leaders— including those assigned to senior national security posts—have spent much time, if any, thinking through civil- military relations either in theory or practice. Even those who have thought about it generally act in a way that aligns with a very different model. The rest simply act according to a logic internally consistent with the dictates of civilian politics.7 Civilians know that there is no fixed division between what is "civilian" and what is "military." The dividing line is where civilian leaders say it is at any given time, and where they draw it can change. This line may fluctuate with the president's personal interests, the threat and political stakes, changes in technology, larger national security considerations, and even with what is going viral in social media that day. Frequently, the dividing line between a decision that civilians believe is theirs to make on strategy and operations can fall far into the domain that the military believes is best insulated from civilian encroachment. In such cases, the recurring lament of American military leaders is that civilians misunderstand or are misplaying their role. They especially call out those civilians involved in the national security policy process who are not in the formal chain of command as are the president and secretary of defense. Faced with civilian oversight from anyone other than the narrow chain of command, the military may think or say, "I believe in civilian control, but you are the wrong civilian." Or if the president or secretary of defense is in the scenario, the military may counter, "You are violating best practice by micromanaging us."8 Of course, it is the president and secretary of defense's prerogative to micromanage if they deem it necessary. Moreover, while it would be inappropriate for any civilian other than those two to issue an actual order to the military, it is not inappropriate for other civilians to request information for and visibility into military matters if the president or secretary of defense has tasked them to oversee military affairs. The point stands: service members and civilians in the policy- making process often believe they are acting properly while the other is falling short in some way, and those beliefs derive from different standards and expectations of how relations ought to go in the ideal. Likewise, civilian policy makers attempt to make decisions as late as possible in the interest of flexibility to preserve the president's political options. The priority for the military is to seek clarity and secure a decision as soon as possible to maximize the time for, and effectiveness of, the plans or strategy that follows. The priority for civilians, particularly those closest to the president, is not to tie the hands of the president by committing to a course of action that cannot be adjusted,

walked back, or abandoned if circumstances warrant. In response to adverse geopolitical surprises, civilians seek options while the military leans strongly toward one clearly defined choice. The military's failure or delay in providing alternative looks like foot- dragging. Civilians' failure to provide clear objectives looks like purposeful delay that could compromise strategy and operations, perhaps undermining the objectives, and lead to the unnecessary waste of lives and treasure. It can be a dialogue of the deaf, sometimes made even more frustrating by each side speaking in jargon, acronyms, and code incomprehensible to the other. Such competing expectations make for a rocky relationship until civilian and military leaders understand one another. This helps explain why American civil- military relations in practice has so many episodes of friction and mistrust even when both sides strive for outcomes important to both, and even when the specter of allowing the military to dominate in some way is nowhere in view. What undermines compromise and cooperation—even the integrity of the process and the possibility of success—is distrust, perhaps fear, on both sides of being dragged by conditions or circumstances into a decision neither wanted and to a purpose incommensurate with the costs. There is one crucial way the marriage analogy breaks down, for this is a decidedly unequal relationship not based on love and often unchosen by either partner. Democratic theory and historical practice recognize that military members are professionals with distinctive expertise that gives them an indispensable voice worth respecting in discussions of strategy. But they are the agents, not the principals. Military subordination to civilian authority is a defining feature of most governments, particularly republican ones, and democracy cannot survive for long without it. Civilian authority derives not from some superior wisdom but from the fact that civilian politicians are chosen and unchosen by the ultimate principal: the electorate. Civilians oversee national security decisions not because they are right but because the Constitution and laws give them the right, the authority, and the responsibility. And it is their right, even when they are wrong in the choices they make. They have a right to be wrong.9 Against this backdrop, as military and civilian learn to understand and relate to one another, they must work together to overcome numerous obstacles. We highlight three that have arisen in every post-1945 administration and a fourth that reflects the unusual tenure of President Donald Trump.

What is "Best Military Advice"? Recent chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when pressed to describe their roles, have often responded that one was "to provide best military advice."10 Viewed in the most positive way, the leaders are trying to indicate that their assignment is to give advice in the policy- making process that conveys their professional judgment about the military dimensions of the problem and that reflects good staff work. It is decidedly not "telling the boss what he or she wants to hear based on political calculations and irrespective of hard military realities." But "best military advice" rarely works in an optimal way. It is misleading as a mantra and, most problematically, often poorly received by civilian superiors when framed that way.11 To civilian ears, "best military advice" can sound like a threat. Civilians do not trust the benign connotation, for when do professionals ever render less than their best opinion or judgment? Instead, it comes across as a thinly veiled attempt to box in the decision makers because "best" implies a singularity. Pick it or else. Or else? Sometimes the "else" is explicit and sometimes just implicit. For instance, the consequences might be militarily dangerous or the domestic political costs significant, but the phrase can in any case feel uncomfortably like a threat. If this single recommendation is rejected and it leaks, that advice becomes the basis for criticism of the decision maker. Perhaps there are occasions when professional military opinion embraces only one alternative, but in practice senior civilian leaders quickly learn, as did Abraham Lincoln, that their challenge is not deciding whether to listen to the generals but deciding which generals to listen to.12 When in 2006 President George W. Bush had some distinguished military professionals advising in favor of the surge and others advising against it, which was the "best military

advice?"13 Civilian leaders need their military advisors to inject technical military considerations and military judgment into decision making to offer perspectives that they, as civilians, may lack. Is it a good idea to station a carrier battle group off the coast indefinitely to shape the environment for effective diplomacy as a civilian might recommend? The president should not have to rule on that question until hearing the logistical challenges and second- and third- order effects for future naval operations that such an indefinite show of force might entail. Or perhaps he or she needs to be briefed on the historical experience of similar decisions in that place or under similar circumstances. Military expertise is indispensable. But fully considered military advice in the form of plans and options can only be developed with an awareness of the larger political context in which the president is operating. The military has the right and the responsibility to present options, even politically unpalatable ones and even when it knows that such advice will be unwelcome in the Pentagon, Congress, or the Oval Office. Correspondingly, civilian decision makers have a right to review alternatives that better reflect their larger purposes, if only to see clearly why one or another course of action is inappropriate. This is true regardless of whether the military is sure a particular course of action is a bad idea. Inherent in the "right to be wrong" is the right to hear viable options that align with what the president thinks is preferable—if only to see how difficult and problematic that course might be. Military advisors who try to short- circuit the process by hiding or omitting certain options or information undermine best practices in civil-military policy making. Worse yet, attempting to substitute their preferences for those of their civilian superiors—and slapping the label "best military advice" on such efforts—will not spin that inconvenient truth away. Worst of all, appearing to box in their bosses will forfeit the trust on which effective relations depends when they inevitably seek other military counsel in search of more options. Properly done, military advice entails speaking up, not speaking out. Speaking up is telling the bosses what they need to hear, not what they want to hear. If senior military leaders have a contrary opinion, it is their professional obligation to ensure civilian leaders know before a decision is cast in stone. But speaking up in private within the chain of command is very different from speaking out, which involves going to the press or to influential people with such access. The latter would surely be interpreted as pressuring a president to accede to military preferences. Seasoned military leaders learn to work with their civilian counterparts in an iterative process that is responsive, candid, and flexible, eventually yielding assessments that might differ markedly from where either side in the dialogue began.14 At the end of the process, best practice yields a decision followed by full and faithful execution. This may be a decision not to decide, to await events, or to otherwise maintain maximum flexibility for the deciding official. Or the decision may involve a course of action riskier than the military thinks wise. Provided the military was consulted, that decision will have been made with full awareness of its perspective. Even if not, provided that the decision is legal, only one outcome is acceptable: obedience. Why No Norm of Resignation? Every American military leader we have engaged on this subject—and we have engaged thousands—understands that the military must resist, even disobey, illegal orders. Likewise, it must obey legal orders, even those it dislikes. Every military leader is trained in how to use the extensive institutional apparatus of military, DOD, and Department of Justice lawyers and other advisers to determine what to do when the legality of an order is questionable. What produces a rich and often contentious discussion is how military leaders should respond to legal orders they judge to be profoundly unethical, immoral, or unwise. In such a situation, can a military leader ask for reassignment or retirement—done either silently or with public protest—rather than obey? The first step toward an answer requires dispelling a myth. Too many senior officers—to include several chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff— have said or written that the duty to disobey illegal orders extends to immoral and unethical orders. As retired Air Force deputy judge advocate general Maj Gen Charles Dunlap carefully explained, the Uniform Code of Military Justice makes no allowance for disobeying "immoral" or "unethical" orders; the choice is

legal versus illegal.15 Military professionalism unequivocally requires everyone in uniform to behave in both a legal and ethical fashion. Still, this dictum does not permit senior officers to resist legal orders based on their own personal standard or definition of what is moral and ethical since that is highly subjective and varies by individual. The only criterion that allows for disobedience is illegality. The matter is simply put. Military members who resist following an illegal order will be protected and exonerated. Alternatively, service members who resist following a legal order that somehow offends a subjective ethical or moral standard can be punished and condemned. It is the job of the voters to punish and remove elected leaders for unwise behavior. At this point, thoughtful senior military leaders usually object that they are not mere automatons who reflexively translate orders into actions. Are there not more options beyond the simple obey/disobey binary? Yes, but the details matter. For starters, it is essential that the military has first exhaustively fulfilled its obligations in advance of a decision. The advisory process is a time for raising awkward questions, offering sensible objections, and clarifying what makes a course of action unwise (or possibly unethical and immoral). The imperative of military obedience does not require the immediate execution of the slightest whim expressed by any responsible civilian. The policy- making process is a dialogue—though an unequal one—not a monologue. Officers who think they have options to consider after an order has been given must first demonstrate that they have not shirked the responsibility to advise in full candor. It takes a certain kind of courage to speak up forcefully even within the confidential policy- making process when the president or secretary of defense has signaled the direction. Yet best practices in civil- military relations require that courage. Best practices also require that the military understands when it has adequately made its case and thus the point where the obligation to advise has been fulfilled— and the point beyond which further pressing of the matter impedes civil- military relations. Many subordinates expect their uniformed superiors to press military perspectives on the civilians, believing in a norm that the military should go beyond "advising" to "advocating" and even "insisting" on certain courses of action.16 In some cases, they misread H. R. McMaster's influential book Dereliction of Duty, assuming that the Vietnam failure at its root was the unwillingness of the Joint Chiefs to stand up to the civilians and, indeed, to resign in the face of civilians who ignored military advice on strategy in the conflict.17 The Joint Chiefs obviously did not resign in the Vietnam War, and such resignations at the topmost military ranks are essentially nonexistent. Many senior officers retire before reaching the topmost position for various reasons. Those in the most sensitive assignments, however, know that a sudden or unexplained departure would be interpreted as some sort of dispute with civilian policy, decisions, or leadership that likely heightened civil- military conflict. Some senior military officers submit their retirement papers when they are fed up with the direction the service or a policy appears to be heading. But this is not resignation. Some submit their retirement papers, usually misidentified as resignation papers, as a substitute for getting fired. Neither is that resignation. Submitting retirement papers gives agency to the superior, who can reject them and insist the officer continue to serve. Resignation removes that agency and thereby subverts the superior's authority.18 The closest example of a possible resignation as a protest in the last three decades is Air Force chief of staff Ron Fogleman's departure before completing his four- year term. In reality, treating this as resignation stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of what happened and why. Fogleman requested an early retirement when he believed that the senior Pentagon civilian leadership had lost confidence in his judgment. He also went silently in the hopes of preventing his leaving being interpreted as a clash with the secretary of defense over blocking the promotion of the general in charge in Saudi Arabia during the lethal Khobar Towers terrorist attack. Nonetheless, Fogleman's effort backfired. His silence led many to believe his was a "resignation in protest," a misinterpretation that persists today.

In the American system, there is no norm of resignation because it undermines civilian control.20 For the top two dozen or so flag officers— the service chiefs, combatant commanders, and commanders of forces in active combat—resignation either in silence or with protest would be a huge news story and trigger a political crisis for the president or secretary of defense. Even the threat of resignation would constitute an attempt to impose military preferences on civilian authorities. Going beyond the role of advising and executing a decision properly ordered by civilian authority directly contradicts civilian control, and the consequences for civil- military relations would reverberate far into the future. Civilians would choose the most senior officers based on their pliability rather than on experience, expertise, ability, character, and other criteria necessary for high command and responsibility. Political leaders already have some incentive to vet appointments for compatibility with administration priorities or policies— in effect, politicizing the high command. There is some tantalizing evidence suggesting this might happen on the margins.21 Nevertheless, the motivations for this sort of corruption in senior officer selection would be far greater if a norm of resignation in protest took hold. Fearing the political consequences of resignation, presidents, secretaries of defense, and service secretaries would trust senior officers less, weakening the candor necessary for intense discussions of critical matters. To forestall the possibility of resignation, consultation with senior officers could become perfunctory window dressing to prevent criticism or political attacks. The threat of resignation could also cause civilian leaders to bend to the will of the military to forestall a politically costly resignation. Either way, resignation with protest as a common practice would soil the advisory process and diminish healthy civil- military relations. As long as the military retains its high standing with the public and high partisanship continues to characterize American politics, the precedent would weaken and perhaps poison civil- military relations to the detriment of effective candor, cooperation, policy, and decision- making. Indeed, there is a strong norm against resignation for good reason, but there is growing evidence that attitudes are changing about whether resignation is appropriate.22 Senior military leaders need to internalize the norm against resignation and reflect on how it shapes and constrains their role in the policy- making process. Congress and the Challenge of Civil- Military Relations Even without resignation as an option, the military is not entirely without recourse when faced with clearly dysfunctional policies or deficient orders from civilian superiors. Thanks to a key design feature of the American system embedded in the Constitution, Congress is also the "civilian" in civilian control. The legislative branch has constitutional powers as direct as deciding the design of military policies and forces and as indirect as having the power of the purse and the authority to approve military promotions and assignments. In practice, the president's commander- in- chief powers and executive functions are vast, particularly during wartime. Clearly, the executive branch enjoys primacy in civilian control of the military. It has the responsibility of command and large staffs for planning and managing strategy and complicated joint and combined operations. But the military is also subordinate to the legislative branch, and woe befalls senior military leaders who fail to appreciate this fact. To be sure, this division and power sharing often put military officers in contentious situations. In theory, the president and Congress work together to authorize, appropriate, and execute military policy. In practice, in the absence of a clearly existential war or military crisis, the president and Congress debate all sorts of military questions, sometimes making the armed services innocent victims of larger partisan struggles. Politically deft military agents have learned over several generations how to balance the president against Congress and vice versa, thus confusing and often warping healthy civil- military relations. Ultimately, these tactics produce less effective military policies and decisions. Because of Congress's constitutional role in making defense policy, it has a legitimate call on military advice and opinion and has levers it can pull to compel a reluctant military to provide advice. Congress must vote to confirm every military officer's rank, and at the topmost levels that vote is on a by- name, by- assignment basis. Before confirmation,

congressional committees require top officers to promise, under oath, that they will give Congress their personal, professional opinion on national security matters if asked during the legislative process. Because of the constitutional separation of powers, Congress cannot force senior military officers to reveal what they told the president during the confidential advisory process. Still, Congress can compel officers to reveal their personal, professional opinions on the matter. This is the constitutionally mandated path of "resistance" for a military officer to register legitimate concerns about a policy or decision. However, it is a delicate situation that can ruin civil- military relations inside the executive branch if done without careful thought and wording. One caveat is that such candor is rarely applauded by the White House, DOD, or armed services, which are more likely to view it as insubordination. In fact, resistance can be tantamount to insubordination if marshalled to champion military perspectives over decisions already made or under consideration. Achieving the right balance is a tightrope the military must walk. Staying balanced means that senior leaders honor their obligation to obey and implement legal orders from the commander in chief, even if they deem them unwise. In parallel, they must meet their constitutional duty to apprise Congress of their personal reservations if directly asked. Throughout the process, senior military leaders must do so without undermining the morale of their forces, which will bear the brunt of any policy decision. The more senior the military officer and the more significant the responsibilities, the more likely that officer will face the tightrope dilemma— perhaps multiple times in a career. Another difficulty in dealing with Congress is parochialism. It is the belief that the military pursues the national interest and that Congress is concerned with only personal or narrowly partisan matters. A military officer looks at a member of Congress and is tempted to think, "All he or she cares about is getting reelected, keeping bases and jobs in their states or districts, and championing the military for political advantage. We are the ones thinking about national security, and they are thinking about the next election." This is a sentiment we have heard countless times from senior military leaders. Such attitudes can be self- defeating, for the officer who displays that mindset in a congressional hearing or other interaction may experience unhappy repercussions. Those holding this view are also somewhat lacking in self- awareness. Military officers can harbor parochial views, sometimes unwittingly, that lie rooted in service culture, their current assignment, or limited career experience. Thus, national security necessitates consideration of many factors, precisely the sort that will be on the minds of the voters and of those who answer to the voters. Senior military officers do not have to answer directly to the electorate and can indulge parochial concerns, wrapping them in the patina of "the national interest," viewing (and believing sincerely) that what is good for their service, command, or function is good for the country. That said, precisely because many members of Congress lack the experience and perhaps even the wherewithal to truly grasp national security affairs in all their variety and complexity, it is important that they be well staffed and well supported in wielding their power. A capable member of Congress can do much good, but a misinformed member can do extraordinary harm. Successful civil- military relations require the military to work closely, cooperatively, and transparently with congressional authorities every bit as carefully as they do in the executive branch.

Military officers who have spent most of their professional lives rising in their service or in joint duties naturally focus on civil- military relations in the top- down hierarchy of the executive branch. Most military facilities feature a pyramid that depicts photos of the chain of command beginning with the commander in chief. Accurate civil- military relations require one more photograph alongside the president: the US Capitol dome. The Distinctive Features of Trumpian Civil- Military Relations The foregoing discussion reflects timeless concerns that can be traced through every administration in the era of American superpower status and many to a much earlier time. Every administration experiences civil- military friction; what distinguishes success from

failure is not avoiding friction but learning how to manage it. Nevertheless, President Trump's single term in office added distinctive twists that made relations especially difficult. Two deserve special, if brief, mention. First, Trump relied to an unusual degree on recently retired or not- yet-retired military officers to fill positions customarily reserved for civilian political appointees. Every administration has made this type of selection, and it is possible to find a precedent for every individual appointment. Nevertheless, the collective and cumulative effect was quite unusual—particularly in the combination of offices so staffed. At one point, President Trump had a recently retired four- star Marine as secretary of defense (one who required a congressional waiver to hold that post), an active- duty three- star Army general as national security advisor, and another recently retired four- star Marine as White House chief of staff—the most politically sensitive and powerful nonelected post in the White House. The secretary of defense position was especially crucial since that post is supposed to embody the key "civilian" below the president in civilian control. While the president is the commander in chief, the presidency has vast functions and responsibilities. The president is thinking about many things all the time while the secretary of defense is the chief civilian thinking about national security. All three of these top offices were also staffed by many deputies and advisors who were themselves current or recently retired military officers. Everyone's first name was "General," and President Trump regularly referred to each as such. As a result, it was a near certainty that the primary military advisor to the president—whom the president looked to for a trusted military opinion—was not the person legally identified as the principal military advisor, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the military voice was likely too prominent during early stages of the Trump presidency, there were concerns that the military voice lost too much of its access in the later stages as Trump tired of "his generals" and they left the administration one by one. In his last weeks in office, Trump did away with regular order altogether, firing his secretary of defense and running military affairs from the White House through a chain of command and policy process populated almost entirely by "acting" and "acting in the capacity of" loyalists, some senior retired military and most unconfirmable in their positions. Trump ended with possibly the weakest civilian team ever to serve as the "civilian" in contemporary civil- military relations. After beginning his administration with boasts about how much the military loved him and he loved the military, Trump ended his term with some of the most fractious relations in recent decades.23 Second, Trump's unusual governing style made a mockery of "best practices" in the military advisory role. Two, largely separate, policy- making processes developed during his tenure. One operated on issues that did not interest the president and on which he never engaged. That process was routine and, on occasion, produced almost textbook examples of how the policy- making process should proceed. For instance, the Trump administration produced a serious National Security Strategy (NSS) in record time. The NSS was closely integrated with the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which largely drove lower- level budgetary decisions. Yet there is little evidence that Trump himself took the NSS seriously or believed in its "allies are important" core message. The NSS proved to be a decent guide to issues the president himself did not personally engage on and to be utterly irrelevant to matters the president cared about, followed, intervened in, and rendered an opinion on. This brings us to the other parallel policy- making process: the twitterverse where the president weighed in, often as a commentator and critic of his own administration. Repeatedly, national security policy would be developed according to a regular interagency process only to be undone by a contradictory and often shocking presidential tweet. "A tweet is not an order" never had to be said before the Trump era but had to be said repeatedly during it. While a tweet was not an order, it was an unprecedented window into the commander in chief's "intent," and so the policy process was repeatedly whipsawed to align with a new eruption. More likely than not, those posts could be traced to some punditry on Fox TV, a longtime Trump hobbyhorse, a comment by or recommendation of a friend, or some political maneuver versus a problem of sufficient

importance to warrant an intervention from the top. The military learned to adjust to these twists without a full- blown crisis, but civil- military relations at the policy- making level were strained close to the breaking point on numerous occasions. President Joseph Biden's promise to return to normalcy—which in civil- military terms meant a return to a normal process with all its friction— was nowhere more welcome than in the Pentagon. Even there, Biden began with norm- breaking of his own. He chose as his secretary of defense former Army general Lloyd Austin, who required a special vote from Congress to waive the legal prohibition on appointing a recently retired professional officer sooner than seven years past retirement. This had been done only twice before in the 69 years the office existed—to confirm Gen George C. Marshall to the position in 1950 and Gen James Mattis in 2017. In both cases, the move was something of a vote of no confidence in the civilian team, to include most notably the presidents themselves. This time, it was likely that Austin's successful confirmation reflected more the crisis of concern about political divisions in the republic after the 6 January attacks on the Capitol by supporters of President Trump than any doubts about Biden's role as civilian commander in chief. But it is undeniable that Austin went to considerable lengths to pledge his commitment to civilian control. He laid out specific steps he would take to shore up the role of civilians in the making of policy precisely to address the types of concerns we outlined above.24 Civil- Military Interaction across Society The other category of issues in American civil- military relations that senior leaders must understand involves interactions with civilian society more broadly, from the individual to entire institutions and from the episodic to the continual. Here again there is a paradox. On the one hand, the US public expresses high levels of trust and confidence in the military. Indeed, the military is the major governmental institution enjoying the highest level of public support, and this has been true since the late 1980s. On the other hand, the public has shown historically low levels of social connection with the military, most notably a low propensity to volunteer to serve in uniform. Thus, while the public highly regards the military, it is distanced from it, as if saying "thanks for your service, but we are glad we don't have to join you." In recent years this large set of intersections and interactions has been labeled a "civil- military gap" or in popular parlance the "1 percent and 99 percent," referring to the tiny portion of the public that serves in uniform either in the active or reserve forces. There are three hardy perennials in this category that every recent administration has encountered at some point, but also some distinctive features peculiar to the Trump era.

Seeds of Alienation The largest concern is a fear that civilian society and the military will become so alienated from each other the result will be a military incapable or unwilling to serve society. Though they had different diagnoses and prescriptions, this was the common concern animating the two great founders of American civil- military relations scholarship, Huntington and Morris Janowitz.25 Huntington saw civilian society and the military as distant from each other, especially at the level of norms and values, and urged civilian society to embrace more of the military's thinking, norms, values, and worldview. Janowitz saw the same disconnect and advised the military to develop a new conception of its role and its professionalism to better align with civilian society. Both saw a natural gap as a problem because they doubted that two groups, so dependent on each other but so antithetical in perspectives, could maintain sufficient respect to sustain effective national security policies. Concerns about the gap escalated with the end of the draft in the early 1970s and have remained high as the all- volunteer force reached maturity in the post– Cold War era. There were brief rally- round- the- flag moments during the invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, but those quickly gave way to doubts about public connections to the military when "the 1 percent went to war and 99 percent went to the mall," a common aphorism heard in the national security community.26 The extensive polling data over the past several decades support several basic conclusions.27 The public holds the military in high regard but seems to be happily unknowing about most military policies and activities. Military

officers are not so divorced in attitudes and opinions from the general public, but there often is a wide gulf of opinion and values between the officer corps and civilian national security elites and elected officials. Both tend to caricature the other and not always in positive terms. Public ignorance about the military extends to the norms of civil- military relations, which have only the most tenuous support from the general public and, in some cases, the military as well. At the same time, the public expresses high confidence in the military but expects it to adjust to shifting civilian values. These include such areas as the role of women in combat, the policing of sexual harassment and assault, or opening the ranks fully to gay, lesbian, and now transgender personnel. This is reminiscent of how the military adjusted to racial integration and legal rights for members more congruent with civilian judicial procedures. The military fully accepts the principle of civilian control but also worries about societal dysfunctions. It notes that only a quarter of the civilian populace at best could even meet the minimum physical, moral, and mental qualifications for admission to the ranks. Increasingly, the military seems to be drawing its recruits from the ever- dwindling pool of families that have prior service connections. Mutual admiration could give way to mutual alienation. As one retired JCS chairman told us, what happens to a force that has been told for decades it represents the best of America? Will it not at some point reach the conclusion that it is indeed better than the rest of America? And from that point, how big of a leap is it to conclude that the inferior civilian society should conform to the superior military values? As one of us has written, "the role of the military is to defend society, not to define it."28 When fewer and fewer Americans have a personal connection to the military, the burden of representing the military to civilian society—and bridging the gap—increasingly falls upon the prominent senior general and flag officers and the men and women they lead. Society cannot rely on the media or Hollywood to portray either side accurately or explain one to the other. Senior leaders need to understand that for the rest of their professional lives, and well into retirement, they are bridging—or widening— that gap, intentionally or unintentionally. Politics and Politicization Over the past several decades, concerns about the civil- military gap have focused on one worry: a growing partisan politicization of the military. This politicization takes several forms. One is the military taking on something of a partisan identity, with disproportionate numbers openly espousing partisan views and much of the body politic viewing the military as "captured" by one of the parties. Another is dragging in, or merely welcoming in, military voices to play a partisan role during political campaigns. A third is the retired military voice growing in prominence in public policy debates, including those that range far from the traditional bailiwick of foreign and defense policy questions. The military has always been considered a conservative institution, one that aligned more easily with traditional values than with progressive liberalism. This view shaped the Founders' approach to building military institutions in the new republic, and it was the starting point for the major theoretical works on American civil- military relations.29 When the professional military was small and on the periphery of American political life— or when it was large but populated by a draft that pulled from nearly all sectors of American society—the ideological profile of the military was of secondary concern. In the era of the all- volunteer force, those concerns.

Here was a large—in fungible fiscal terms, a dominating spending institution—almost entirely composed of people who chose to be in the institution, recruited others to follow them, and selected their own leadership except at the very top. In the process, the military started to shed its long- standing image as apolitical—an institution outside of party politics—and increasingly looked partisan. As political polarization intensified in the body politic, the military increasingly looked like a Republican institution.30 Experts debated the extent of the Republican identity, noting it was less pronounced in the enlisted ranks with more diversity in ethnicity, race, gender, and geographic location of origin—but not the direction of the skew.31 Perhaps inevitably, as

partisan polarization has increasingly characterized political life, so too does it seem to shape public perception of the armed forces. Some experts suggest that Republicans and possibly Democrats view the military through a tribal lens—Republicans as an "us" and Democrats as a "them"—that distorted perceptions accordingly.32 The drift has been gradual and may be driven as much by division in the larger civilian society as by changes in the makeup or behavior of the military itself. Regardless of the cause, it poses a challenge for healthy civil- military relations during an era when the military consumes a large fraction of the discretionary federal budget and is so visible in civic life. Notwithstanding a new partisan appearance, the military remains one of the few institutions held in high regard across the political spectrum. Consequently, politicians have increasingly used the military to further partisan political ends. Thus, every four years, we have the unseemly spectacle of political candidates—especially those seeking the presidency—recruiting endorsements from senior retired military officers to persuade Americans to vote accordingly. Regulations forbid the active duty military to express an open preference, so candidates look for the next best thing: retired senior officers whose first names remain "General" or "Admiral" after they stop wearing the uniform. The higher the rank, the more recently retired, and the more famous, the better.33 Every chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the past 20 years has expressed dismay in private or public about this practice because it falsely implies a preference for the active duty military, making the job of serving the commander in chief and working with Congress, regardless of party, more difficult. But the practice continues and in 2016 reached a new, tawdry level with senior retired officers going well beyond anodyne endorsements. At the national party nominating conventions, their rhetoric crossed over into the most vitriolic of ad hominem attacks of the sort considered inappropriate for the candidates themselves to level.34 Campaigns cannot be expected to exercise self- restraint in this area.

Hence, the military will escape the political muck only if retired officers resist the temptation to trade on their institutions' reputation for lack of partisanship to commit a brazenly political act. If they wish to join the political fray, they should do so openly as political candidates themselves and not pretend to speak as apolitical observers.35 Senior officers on active duty also worry about another form of politicization: the prominent role given retired military veterans as pundits in ongoing policy debates, usually as talking heads on television or purveyors of "gotcha" quotes in news stories. This occurrence has a long pedigree in American civil- military relations. President Dwight Eisenhower worried aloud in his farewell address about a "military- industrial complex" that distorted policy debates by throwing the power of mutual interests behind a certain course of action.36 These concerns have increased in an age when the news cycle never ends and "everything became war and the military became everything."37 In our view, this form of politicization is less worrisome if only because the military perspective on policy is a legitimate concern and in practice, every veteran voice on one side of a policy issue is usually counterbalanced by an equal and opposite veteran voice on the other. If anything, this dynamic only reinforces the fundamental civilian challenge in policy making: not whether to heed military advice but which military opinion to heed. Yet the public second- guessing by former senior officers who may have lost situational awareness of the full picture is especially grating to the current military advisors. Senior military leaders need to think in advance how they want to wield their remaining influence once they join the ranks of the retired. Budgets and the Myth of a "Civil- Military Contract" The gap gives rise to an enduring myth of American civil- military relations that American society has an implicit contract with the military: a promise to adequately resource and support these men and women in exchange for the risk of their lives on behalf of the nation. Generations of military leaders have mentioned such a contract in countless speeches, but the sad truth is that American society did not act as if there was one—at least not regarding the professional armed forces—for almost all of American history. There is hardly anything more

"American" than underfunding the military in peacetime. The prevailing pattern in American military history up through the Korean War was to shirk readiness in peacetime, discover the full extent of this deficiency just before or during the early stages of an armed conflict, and repair the damage by ramping up the military capacity to achieve a victory only to hastily demobilize and return to peacetime levels of readiness—then repeat the cycle. Indeed, for most of its history up until the Cold War, the United States practiced a national security policy of relatively small peacetime professional forces and mobilization/demobilization for wars. To the extent there was any societal contract with the military, it was a narrowly drawn one with its citizen soldiers, especially its draftees, symbolized by its system of pensions after the War for Independence and the Civil War, the Veterans Administration after World War I, and the GI Bill after World War II. Over the course of the Cold War, when the military was peopled by draftees and volunteers, and since the onset of the all- volunteer force in the early 1970s, the contract became more robust as the distinction between temporary citizen soldiers and the professional military waned. Even then, some of the promises for health care and other benefits did not seem to fit the idea of "the contract" as expressed by military leaders. Today, the notion of a societal contract with the military may face a new test. In the five decades since the introduction of the all- volunteer armed forces, thanks to a dramatic expansion in defense spending along with increased pay and benefits, two generations of officers have come of age without personal experience with the previous norm of a chronically underfunded military. Now, all the signs seem to augur a new era of major budget challenges. Intensifying great power conflict and competition imply a new, expensive arms race just as the consequences of previous budget choices create grave fiscal pressure for cutbacks. These cannot be waived away with a glib reference to a societal contract with those who promise to defend us. The current generation of service members may see a leveling or decline in defense spending—while personnel costs for both active duty and veterans strain both budgets—and an unwillingness to sustain a military establishment that competes with expanding domestic spending and continues to add to a swollen national debt. The Distinctive Features of Trumpian Civil- Military Relations None of the foregoing would surprise the generation that founded the United States. Yet the Trump tenure put its own stamp on these problems. Trump enthusiastically embraced and indeed encouraged the politicization of the military, accentuating and exaggerating it at almost every opportunity.38 Whereas previous presidents at least paid lip service to the idea of an apolitical military, Trump talked openly about the military as part of his political base. At the outset, he openly referred to military leaders as "my generals," only to turn on them and publicly castigate them when their advice contradicted his desires or they left his employ.

In response to critiques from prominent retired senior military officers, Trump openly denounced the senior ranks as war- hungry careerists eager to increase weapon sales while insisting that the lower ranks remained personally loyal to him.40 Likewise, Trump repeatedly sought to use the military in settings that crossed the boundary into the nakedly political. During his first few weeks in office, he surprised the Defense Department by turning a standard meet- and- greet visit to the Pentagon into a signing ceremony for his controversial ban on refugees from Muslim majority countries.41 He repeatedly sought to get the military to provide him a flashy parade through Washington, DC, large enough to rival the Bastille Day parade President Emanuel Macron hosted for Trump in France, despite no American prece dent for such parades on American national holidays.42 In the run- up to the 2018 midterm elections when he could not get Congress to fund the building of a wall along the border with Mexico, he declared a national emergency, shifted military appropriations to the wall, and directed military personnel to patrol the border.43 In each of these instances, the military dragged its feet but, acceding to civilian control, mostly went along with the controversial actions. The breaking point came in the wake of the killing of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer in spring 2020. As localities struggled with protests, a few

including violence and some even in the vicinity of the White House, President Trump ordered the National Guard to patrol the streets of Washington. He flirted with mobilizing active duty units for a more dramatic show of force, subsequently arranging for the JCS chairman and defense secretary to join him on a photo- op walk across Lafayette Park after peaceful protestors there had been forcibly dispersed. The photo op, clearly political, crossed an ethical line, causing JCS chairman Gen Mark Milley and Defense Secretary Mark Esper (a West Point graduate and retired Army Reserve officer) to apologize publicly for appearing in a political event—probably the first-ever public apology from a chairman for something so obviously partisan.44 Esper paid for his public disagreement with Trump by being summarily fired after Trump lost the presidential election.45 After this rupture came the extraordinary events of 6 January. A mob inflamed by President Trump's false claims that he was a victim of massive electoral fraud battled the police, broke into the Capitol building, and tried to thwart the process of confirming Biden's electoral college victory. Some mob participants may even have sought to kill political leaders they thought stood in the way of a second Trump term. Security forces may have been slow to respond to the unfolding chaos out of fear that they would get caught once again in a political cross fire, but after a delay they sided decisively with the constitutional order and ensured that the transfer of presidential power could occur without further interruption. Nevertheless, the prominence of some veterans among the most violent of would

be insurrectionists raised concerns about the presence of extremists in the military—and renewed calls for the military to recommit to the traditional apolitical norm.46 The Biden administration team has made it clear that it will prioritize restoring old norms and redlines on politicization, but undoing the damage to the perception of the military as an apolitical institution may take years of scrupulous behavior by civilian and military alike. Conclusion: What Can Be Done Every senior military and civilian leader will face at least a few of the challenges addressed above, and most will encounter them all at some point in a career or in retirement. Each challenge is made more manageable if civilian and military leaders develop relationships characterized by trust and candor. Trust is the universal solvent in civil- military relations. It is the bene fit of the doubt earned over patterns of responsible conduct where each party speaks fully and straightforwardly with the other, genuinely seeks mutual understanding, and partners in cooperation for shared objectives. Trust is intentionally built through deliberate action. Because of the two paradoxes of American civil- military relations, it cannot merely be assumed. Trust is developed step by step through frequent interactions and conversations, formal and informal, in the workplace and at social events. It constitutes a reservoir that must be filled in advance, only to be drawn down in a crisis and quickly replenished. When trust is most needed, it is too late to build it. Although the military is clearly the subordinate in this relationship, it must be the initiator and not wait for superiors to take the first step. In our experience, senior military leaders spend remarkably little time—and senior civilian leaders even less—reflecting on the dynamics that shape American civil-military relations. As with other professional occupations (e.g., lawyers, doctors, teachers, and the clergy), it is up to the experts, not their bosses or clients, to mold the relationship and influence the interactions as much as they can to provide the most functional and effective outcomes. It is up to the professionals to think through the ethical guidelines; learn, rehearse, and promote best practices; and apply them in an ongoing fashion even from a subordinate position. All military officers lead their subordinates but must also help their superiors to be successful commanders and leaders. Sometimes it falls to the subordinate to prepare the superior to lead with maximum effectiveness. This might be thought of as "leading from the middle"—a challenging, daunting assignment but hardly impossible. Generations of senior military leaders, stretching back to George Washington, figured out how to do it well with civilians of disparate abilities. It would be productive if civilian leaders joined enthusiastically in studying civil- military relations. More importantly, however, military leaders must commit to taking on the responsibility to know and

study civil- military relations. They must prepare their peers and subordinates to assume stewardship of healthy civil- military relations for the good of our future.

Civil–military relations components

Civil–military relations (**Civ-Mil** or **CMR**) describes the relationship between military organizations and civil society, military organizations and other government bureaucracies, and leaders and the military.[1] CMR incorporates a diverse, often normative field, which moves within and across management, social science and policy scales.[2] More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. "The goal of any state is to harness military professional power to serve vital national security interests, while guarding against the misuse of power that can threaten the well-being of its people."[3] Studies of civil-military relations often rest on a normative assumption that it is preferable to have the ultimate responsibility for a country's strategic decision-making to lie in the hands of the civilian political leadership (i.e. civilian control of the military) rather than a military (a military dictatorship).

A paradox lies at the center of traditional civil-military relations theory. The military, an institution designed to protect the polity, must also be strong enough to threaten the society it serves. A military take-over or coup is an example where this balance is used to change the government. Ultimately, the military must accept that civilian authorities have the "right to be wrong".[4] In other words, they may be responsible for carrying out a policy decision they disagree with. Civilian supremacy over the military is a complicated matter. The rightness or wrongness of a policy or decision can be ambiguous. Civilian decision makers may be impervious to corrective information. The relationship between civilian authorities and military leaders must be worked out in practice.[5]

The principal problem they examine, however, is empirical: to explain how civilian control over the military is established and maintained.[6][7] In the broader sense it examines the ways society and military intersect or interact and includes topics such as the integration of veterans into society, methods used to recruit and retain service members, and the fairness and efficacy of these systems, the integration of minorities, women, and the LGBT community into the military, the behavior and consequences of private contractors, the role of culture in military organizations, voting behavior of soldiers and veterans, and the gaps in policy preferences between civilians and soldiers.[8]

While generally not considered a separate academic area of study in and of itself, it involves scholars and practitioners from many fields and specialties.[9] Apart from political science and sociology, Civ-Mil (CMR) draws upon such diverse fields as law, philosophy, area studies, psychology, cultural studies, anthropology, economics, history, diplomatic history, journalism, and the military, among others. It involves study and discussion of a diverse range of issues including but not limited to: civilian control of the military, military professionalism, war, civil-military operations, military institutions, and other related subjects. International in scope, civil-military relations involves discussion and research from across the world. The theoretical discussion can include non-state actors[10][11] as well as more traditional nation-states. Other research involves discerning the details of military political attitudes, voting behavior,[12][13][14]

and the potential impact on and interaction with democratic society[15][16] as well as military families.

History

The history of civil-military relations can be traced to the writings of Sun Tzu[21] and Carl von Clausewitz,[22] both of whom argued that military organizations were primarily the servants of the state.

Concerns about a growing militarism in society, largely coming from the experiences of the first half of the twentieth century, engendered an examination into the impact of military organizations within society.[23][24]

The ramifications of the Cold War, specifically the American decision to maintain a large standing army for the first time in its history, led to concerns about whether such a large military structure could be effectively maintained by a liberal democracy. Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz published the seminal books on the subject which effectively brought civil-military relations into academia, particularly in political science and sociology.[25][26]

Despite the peculiarly American impetus for Huntington's and Janowitz's writing, their theoretical arguments have been used in the study of other national civil-military studies. For example, Ayesha Ray used the ideas of Huntington in her book about Indian civil-military relations.[27] In *The Man on Horseback*, Samuel E. Finer countered some of Huntington's arguments and assumption and offered a look into the civil-military relationships in the under-developed world. Finer observed that many governments do not have the administrative skills to efficiently govern which may open opportunities for military intervention—opportunities that are not as likely in more developed countries.[28]

The increased incidence of military coups d'état since World War II, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, brought about a growing interest in academic and journalistic circles in studying the nature of such coups. Political upheaval in Africa led to military take-overs in Dahomey, Togo, Congo, and Uganda, to mention just a few.[29] Political unrest in South America, which involved military coups in Bolivia (189 military coups in its first 169 years of existence), Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, was largely a result of forces attempting to stem the increasing influence of left-wing and communist led uprisings.[30] The 2006 military coup in Thailand engendered continued interest in this area.[31]

The end of the Cold War led to new debate about to the proper role of the military in society, both in the United States and in the former Soviet Union. However, as before, much of the discussion revolved around whether the power of the state was in decline and whether an appropriate level of civilian control was being brought to bear on the military.[32][33][34][35][36]

Professional organization and journal

The principal professional organization for civil-military scholars is the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS). The IUS sponsors *Armed Forces & Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal* which publishes articles on civil-military relations, force diversity, veterans, military families, privatization, officer training, recruitment and retention, public opinion, conflict management, unit cohesion, ethics, and peacemaking. The journal *Armed*

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Forces & Society is located at [Texas State University](#) and is currently edited by [Patricia M. Shields](#).[37] The [Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society](#) and the journal are international in scope. They have a conference every other year in odd years. The 2017 conference was held in Reston VA.

Major theoretical discussions in civil-military relations

In 1945, the United States began a demobilization of the massive military force that had been built up during World War II. Strong public and bipartisan pressure succeeded in forcing the government to bring American soldiers home and to reduce the size of the armed forces quickly. Strikes and even some rioting by military personnel at overseas bases in January 1946 pressured President [Harry S. Truman](#) to continue the process despite growing concern about the Soviet Union and an increasing recognition that the United States was not going to be able to retreat into the isolationism of the pre-war years. Attempts in the [United States Congress](#) to continue [conscription](#) to provide a trained reserve as a replacement for a large standing military force failed and, in 1947, the World War II draft law expired.

By the summer of 1950, the armed forces of the United States had fewer than 1.5 million personnel on active duty, down from a high of 12 million in 1945. By the next year, however, in response to [North Korea](#)'s invasion of [South Korea](#), the size of the U.S. military was again on the rise, doubling to more than 3.2 million personnel. Reaching a high of 3.6 million in 1953, the total number of personnel on active duty in the U.S. military never again dropped below two million during the 40-plus years of the [Cold War](#). After the fall of the [Berlin Wall](#) and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the size of the active-duty force had, by 1999, dropped to just under 1.4 million personnel. As of February 28, 2009, a total of 1,398,378 men and women remain on active duty in the U.S. armed forces.

The size of the U.S. military in the latter half of the twentieth century, unprecedented in peacetime, caused concern in some circles, primarily as to the potential effect of maintaining such a large force in a democratic society. Some predicted disaster and were concerned with the growing militarization of American society. These writers were quite sure that a distinctly military culture was inherently dangerous to a non-militaristic liberal society. Others warned that the ascendancy of the military establishment would fundamentally change American foreign policy and would weaken the intellectual fabric of the country. However, most of the arguments were less apocalyptic and settled along two tracks. The two tracks are highlighted, respectively, by Samuel P. Huntington's *Soldier and the State* and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*.

The debate focused primarily on the nature of the relationship between the civilian and military worlds. There was widespread agreement that there were two distinct worlds and that they were fundamentally different from one another. The argument was over how best to ensure that the two could coexist without endangering [liberal democracy](#).

Institutional theory

Samuel P. Huntington

In his seminal 1957 book on civil-military relations, [*The Soldier and the State*](#), [Samuel P. Huntington](#) described the differences between the two worlds as a contrast between the attitudes and values held by military personnel, mostly [conservative](#), and those held by civilians, mostly

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liberal. Each world consisted of a separate institution with its own operative rules and norms. The military's function was furthermore inherently different from that of the civilian world. Given a more conservative military world which was illiberal in many aspects, it was necessary to find a method of ensuring that the liberal civilian world would be able to maintain its dominance over the military world. Huntington's answer to this problem was "military professionalism."

Huntington focused his study on the officer corps. He first defined a profession and explained that enlisted personnel, while certainly part of the military world, are not, strictly speaking, professionals. He relegated them to the role of tradesmen or skilled craftsmen, necessary but not professionals in his definition of the term. It was professional military officers, not the enlisted technicians of the trade of violence, or even the part-time or amateur reserve officers extant in the mid-1950s (as opposed to the near "part-time 'regular'" status characterizing reserve officers with extensive active duty experience, professional military education, and active combat experience in the post-Gulf War period), who would be the key to controlling the military world.

Professionalizing the military, or at least the officer corps, which is the decision-making authority within the military world, emphasizes the useful aspects of that institution such as discipline, structure, order, and self-sacrifice. It also isolates the corps in a specialized arena in which the military professionals would be recognized as experts in the use of force. As recognized experts not subject to the interference of the civilian world, the military's officer corps would willingly submit itself to civil authority. In Huntington's words, such an arrangement maintained a "focus on a politically neutral, autonomous, and professional officer corps."

In order for the civilian authority to maintain control, it needed to have a way to direct the military without unduly infringing on the prerogatives of the military world and thus provoking a backlash. Civilian leadership would decide the objective of any military action but then leave it to the military world to decide upon the best way of achieving the objective. The problem facing civilian authority, then, is in deciding on the ideal amount of control. Too much control over the military could result in a force too weak to defend the nation, resulting in failure on the battlefield. Too little control would create the possibility of a coup, i.e., failure of the government.

Huntington's answer to the control dilemma was "objective civilian control." This was in contrast to "subjective control," in which direction would be more intrusive and detailed. To put it simply, the more "objective civilian control," the more military security. Civilian control, then, is the independent variable for the subsequent dependent variable of military effectiveness.

If civilian control is the critical variable for military effectiveness, it raises the question of how civilian control is then to be determined. Huntington identified two shaping forces or imperatives for civilian control – (1) functional and (2) societal. He broke the societal imperative into two components, ideology and structure. By ideology, he meant a world-view or paradigm: liberal anti-military, conservative pro-military, fascist pro-military, and Marxist anti-military. By structure, he meant the legal-constitutional framework that guided political affairs generally and civil-military affairs specifically.

According to Huntington and early studies of civil-military relationships, it is considered that effective civil-military relations should be in the form of objective civilian control over their

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armed forces. This control is indicated by the following factors; (1) the military's adoption of professional ethos and their recognition of boundaries of professional roles, (2) effective subordination of the military to civilian political leadership that formulates strategic directives on foreign and military policies, (3) recognition and approval from political leaders to the professional authorities and autonomy of the military and (4) minimal intervention of the military in politics and of politicians in military affairs.

If Huntington's imperatives are the independent variables, then the variable of civilian control becomes, in turn, an explanatory variable for military security. However, Huntington says that both societal imperatives, ideology, and structure, are unchanging, at least in the American case. If that is the case, then the functional imperative is fully explanatory for changes in civilian control and subsequently military security. In short, if external threats are low, liberal ideology "extirpates" or eliminates military forces. If external threats are high, liberal ideology produces a "transmutation" effect that will re-create the military in accordance with liberalism, but in such a form that it will lose its "peculiarly military characteristics." Transmutation will work for short periods, such as to fight a war, but will not, over time, assure military security. This appears to explain well the pattern of American militarization and demobilization, at least until the initiation of the Cold War.

With the understanding that the rise of the Soviet Union created a long-term threat, Huntington concluded that the liberal society of the United States would fail to create adequate military forces to ensure security over the long term. The only circumstance he could foresee that would permit adequate military security was for the United States to change the societal imperative. "The tension between the demands of military security and the values of American liberalism can, in the long run, be relieved only by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism." The only way the United States could adequately provide security in the face of a long-term threat such as the Soviet Union, in other words, was for American society to become more conservative.

Risa Brooks argues that the health of civil-military relations is best judged by whether there is a (i) preference divergence between military and political leaders, and (ii) whether there is a power imbalance. She argues that the healthiest arrangement of civil-military relations is when the preferences between military and political leaders is low, and political leaders have a dominant power advantage. She argues that the worst kind of civil-military relations is when there is high preference divergence, as well as a power balance between the military and political leaders.

Convergence theory

The other principal thread within the civil-military theoretical debate was that generated in 1960 by Morris Janowitz in *The Professional Soldier*. Janowitz agreed with Huntington that separate military and civilian worlds existed, but differed from his predecessor regarding the ideal solution for preventing danger to liberal democracy. Since the military world as he saw it was fundamentally conservative, it would resist change and not adapt as rapidly as the more open and unstructured civilian society to changes in the world. Thus, according to Janowitz, the military would benefit from exactly what Huntington argued against – outside intervention.

Janowitz introduced a theory of convergence, arguing that the military, despite the extremely slow pace of change, was in fact changing even without external pressure. Convergence theory postulated either a civilianization of the military or a militarization of society [67][70][76][83][84]

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However, despite this convergence, Janowitz insisted that the military world would retain certain essential differences from the civilian and that it would remain recognizably military in nature.[85]

Janowitz agreed with Huntington that, because of the fundamental differences between the civilian and military worlds, clashes would develop which would diminish the goal of civilian control of the military. His answer was to ensure that convergence occurred, thus ensuring that the military world would be imbued with the norms and expectations of the society that created it. He encouraged use of conscription, which would bring a wide variety of individuals into the military. He also encouraged the use of more Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs at colleges and universities to ensure that the military academies did not have a monopoly on the type of officer, particularly the senior general officer and flag officer leadership positions, in the military services. He specifically encouraged the development of ROTC programs in the more elite universities, so that the broader influences of society would be represented by the officer corps. The more such societal influences present within the military culture, the smaller the attitudinal differences between the two worlds and the greater the chance of civilians maintaining control over the military. Janowitz, like Huntington, believed that the civilian and military worlds were different from one another; while Huntington developed a theory to control the difference, Janowitz developed a theory to diminish the difference.

In response to Huntington's position on the functional imperative, Janowitz concluded that in the new nuclear age, the United States was going to have to be able to deliver both strategic deterrence and an ability to participate in limited wars. Such a regime, new in American history, was going to require a new military self-conception, the constabulary concept: "The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory..." Under this new concept of the military establishment, distinctions between war and peace are more difficult to draw. The military, instead of viewing itself as a fire company to be called out in emergency, would then be required to imagine itself in the role of a police force, albeit on the international level rather than domestically. The role of the civilian elite would be to interact closely with the military elite so as to ensure a new and higher standard of professional military education, one that would ensure that military professionals were more closely attuned to the ideals and norms of civilian society.

Institutional/occupational hypothesis

Charles Moskos developed the institutional/occupational (I/O) hypothesis as a means to promote comparative historical studies of military organization and military change. This hypothesis evolved into the Postmodern Military Model, which helped predict the course of civil-military relations after the end of the Cold War. The I/O hypothesis argued that the military was moving away from an institutional model towards one that was more occupational in nature. An institutional model presents the military as an organization highly divergent from civilian society while an occupational model presents the military more convergent with civilian structures. While Moskos did not propose that the military was ever "entirely separate or entirely coterminous with civilian society", the use of a scale helped better to highlight the changing interface between the armed forces and society.

Agency theory

The [Vietnam War](#) opened deep arguments about civil-military relations that continue to exert powerful influences today. One centered on a contention within military circles that the United States lost the war because of unnecessary civilian meddling in military matters. It was argued that the civilian leadership failed to understand how to use military force and improperly restrained the use of force in achieving victory. Among the first to analyze the war critically was [Harry Summers](#), who used [Clausewitz](#) as his theoretical basis. He argued that the principal reason for the loss of the [Vietnam War](#) was a failure on the part of the political leadership to understand the goal, which was victory. The Army, always successful on the battlefield, ultimately did not achieve victory because it was misused and misunderstood. Summers argued that the conduct of the war violated many classical principals as described by Clausewitz, thereby contributing to failure. He ended his analysis with a "quintessential strategic lesson learned": that the Army must become "masters of the profession of arms," thus reinforcing an idea along the lines of Huntington's argument for strengthening military professionalism.

[H.R. McMaster](#)[92] observed that it was easier for officers in the [Gulf War](#) to connect national policy to the actual fighting than was the case during Vietnam. He concluded that the Vietnam War had actually been lost in Washington, D.C., before any fighting occurred, due to a fundamental failure on the part of the civilian and military actors involved to argue the issues adequately. McMaster, who urged a more direct debate between civilians and the military on defense policy and actions, and Summers, who argued for a clear separation between civilians and the military, both pointed out controversies over the proper roles of civilian and military leaders.

Despite those controversies and the apparent lessons learned from the Vietnam War, some theorists recognized a significant problem with Huntington's theory insofar as it appears to question the notion of a separate, apolitical professional military. While there is little argument that separate civilian and military worlds exist, there is significant debate about the proper interaction between the two. As discussed above, Huntington proposed that the ideal arrangement was one whereby civilian political leaders provided objective control to the military leadership and then stepped back to permit the experts in violence to do what was most effective. He further stated that the most dangerous arrangement was one whereby civilian leaders intruded extensively in the military world, creating a situation whereby the military leadership was not politically neutral and security of the nation was thus threatened both by an ineffective military and by provoking the military to avoid taking orders.

Arguably, however, and despite Huntington's urging otherwise, U.S. civilian leadership had been intrusive in its control over the military, not only during the Vietnam War, but also during much of the Cold War. During that time, the military elite had been extensively involved in the politics of defense budgets and management, and yet the United States had managed to emerge successfully from the Cold War. Despite that, none of Huntington's more dire predictions had proven true.

In response to this apparent "puzzle," [Peter D. Feaver](#) laid out an agency theory of civil-military relations, which he argued should replace Huntington's institutional theory. Taking a rationalist approach, he used a [principal-agent](#) framework, drawn from [microeconomics](#), to explore how actors in a superior position influence those in a subordinate role. He used the concepts of "working" and "shirking" to explain the actions of the subordinate. In his construct, the principal

is the civilian leadership that has the responsibility of establishing policy. The agent is the military that will work – carry out the designated task – or shirk – evading the principal's wishes and carrying out actions that further the military's own interests. Shirking at its worst may be disobedience, but Feaver includes such things as "foot-dragging" and leaks to the press.

The problem for the principal is how to ensure that the agent is doing what the principal wants done. Agency theory predicts that if the costs of monitoring the agent are low, the principal will use intrusive methods of control. Intrusive methods include, for the executive branch, such things as inspections, reports, reviews of military plans, and detailed control of the budget, and for Congress, committee oversight hearings and requiring routine reports. For the military agent, if the likelihood that shirking will be detected by the civilian principal is high or if the perceived costs of being punished are too high, the likelihood of shirking is low.

Feaver argued that his theory was different from other theories or models in that it was purely deductive, based on democratic theory rather than on anecdotal evidence, and better enabled analysis of day-to-day decisions and actions on the part of the civilian and military leadership. It operated at the intersection of Huntington's institutional approach and Janowitz's sociological point of view. Huntington concentrated on the relationship between civilian leadership and the military qua institution while Janowitz focused on the relationship of the military qua individuals to American society. Agency theory provided a link between the two enabling an explanation of how civil-military relations work on a day-to-day basis. Specifically, agency theory would predict that the result of a regime of intrusive monitoring by the civilian leadership combined with shirking on the part of the military would result in the highest levels of civil-military conflict. Feaver suggested that post-Cold War developments had so profoundly reduced the perceived costs of monitoring and reduced the perceived expectation of punishment that the gap between what civilians ask the military to do and what the military would prefer to do had increased to unprecedented levels.

Concordance theory

After observing that most civil-military theory assumes that the civilian and military worlds must necessarily be separate, both physically and ideologically, Rebecca L. Schiff offered a new theory—Concordance—as an alternative. One of the key questions in Civil-Military Relations (CMR) theory has always been to determine under what conditions the military will intervene in the domestic politics of the nation. Most scholars agree with the theory of objective civilian control of the military (Huntington), which focuses on the separation of civil and military institutions. Such a view concentrates and relies heavily on the U.S. case, from an institutional perspective, and especially during the Cold War period. Schiff provides an alternative theory, from both institutional and cultural perspectives, that explains the U.S. case as well as several non-U.S. civil-military relations case studies.

While concordance theory does not preclude a separation between the civilian and military worlds, it does not require such a state to exist. She argues that three societal institutions—(1) the military, (2) political elites, and (3) the citizenry must aim for a cooperative arrangement and some agreement on four primary indicators:

1. Social composition of the officer corps.
2. The political decision-making process.
3. The method of recruiting military personnel.

4. The style of the military.

If agreement occurs among the three partners with respect to the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur. In her book, *The Military and Domestic Politics*, she applied her theory to six international historical cases studies: U.S., post–Second World War period; American Post-Revolutionary Period (1790–1800); Israel (1980–90); Argentina (1945–55); India post-Independence and 1980s; Pakistan (1958–69).

Concordance theory has been applied to emerging democracies, which have more immediate threat of coups.

Other civil-military relations issues

Liberal theory and the American Founding Fathers

At the heart of civil-military relations is the problem of how a civilian government can control and remain safe from the military institution it created for its own protection. A military force that is strong enough to do what is asked of it must not also pose a danger to the controlling government. This poses the paradox that "because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection".

The solution to this problem throughout most of American history was to keep its standing army small, relying on augmentation from militias (the predecessor of modern-day Reserve forces, to include the National Guard) and volunteers. While armed forces were built up during wartime, the pattern after every war up to and including World War II was to demobilize quickly and return to something approaching pre-war force levels. However, with the advent of the Cold War in the 1950s, the need to create and maintain a sizable peacetime military force engendered new concerns of militarism and about how such a large force would affect civil-military relations in the United States. For the first time in American history, the problem of civil-military relations would have to be managed during peacetime.

The men who wrote the Constitution of the United States were fearful of large standing armies, legislatures that had too much power, and perhaps most of all, a powerful executive who might be able to wage war on his own authority. All were objects of concern because of the dangers each posed to liberal democracy and a free citizenry. While it is often impossible to "gauge accurately the intent of the Framers",[103] it is nevertheless important to understand the motivations and concerns of the writers with respect to the appropriate relationship between civil and military authority. The *Federalist Papers* provide a helpful view of how they understood the relationship between civil authority, as represented by the executive branch and the legislature, and military authority.

In Federalist No. 8, Alexander Hamilton worried that maintaining a large standing army would be a dangerous and expensive undertaking. In his principal argument for the ratification of the proposed constitution, he argued that only by maintaining a strong union could the new country avoid such a pitfall. Using the European experience as a negative example and the British experience as a positive one, he presented the idea of a strong nation protected by a navy with no need of a standing army. The implication was that control of a large military force is, at best, difficult and expensive, and at worst invites war and division. He foresaw the necessity of creating a civilian government that kept the military at a distance.

[James Madison](#), another writer of several of the *[Federalist Papers](#)*, expressed his concern about a standing military in comments before the Constitutional Convention in June 1787:

In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of War, has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive, will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense against foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.

The [United States Constitution](#) placed considerable limitations on the [legislature](#). Coming from a tradition of legislative superiority in government, many were concerned that the proposed Constitution would place so many limitations on the legislature that it would become impossible for such a body to prevent an executive from starting a war. Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 26 that it would be equally as bad for a legislature to be unfettered by any other agency and that restraints would actually be more likely to preserve liberty. James Madison, in [Federalist No. 47](#), continued Hamilton's argument that distributing powers among the various branches of government would prevent any one group from gaining so much power as to become unassailable. In [Federalist No. 48](#), however, Madison warned that while the separation of powers is important, the departments must not be so far separated as to have no ability to control the others.

Finally, in [Federalist No. 51](#), Madison argued that to create a government that relied primarily on the good nature of the incumbent to ensure proper government was folly. Institutions must be in place to check incompetent or malevolent leaders. Most importantly, no single branch of government ought to have control over any single aspect of governing. Thus, all three branches of government must have some control over the military, and the system of checks and balances maintained among the other branches would serve to help control the military.

Hamilton and Madison thus had two major concerns: (1) the detrimental effect on liberty and democracy of a large standing army and (2) the ability of an unchecked legislature or executive to take the country to war precipitously. These concerns drove American military policy for the first century and a half of the country's existence. Until the 1950s, the maintenance of a large military force by the United States was an exceptional circumstance and was restricted to times of war. Following every war up to and including World War II, the military was quickly demobilized and reduced to near pre-war levels.

Civilian-military culture gap thesis

Most debates in civil-military relations assumed that a separation between the civilian and military worlds was inevitable and likely necessary. The argument had been over whether to control the gap between the two worlds (Huntington) or to minimize the gap by enacting certain policies (Janowitz). Following the end of the Cold War in 1989, however, the discussion began to focus on the nature of the apparent gap between civilian and military cultures and, more specifically, whether that gap had reached such proportions as to pose a danger to civilian control of the military. Part of the debate was based on the cultural differences between the more liberal civilian society and the conservative military society, and on the recognition that such differences had apparently become more pronounced than in past years.

[Alfred Vagts](#) had already begun the discussion from an historical point of view, concentrating on the German/Prussian military experience. He was perhaps most influential with his definition of [militarism](#), which he described as the state of a society that "ranks military institutions and ways above the prevailing attitudes of civilian life and carries the military mentality into the civilian sphere." Louis Smith, whose work pre-dated Huntington's, discussed issues of congressional and judicial control over the military as well as executive civilian control of military matters. However, all that discussion predated a general recognition that the American experience was going to change in the post-World War II era. Once it became apparent that the American military was going to maintain historically high levels of active-duty personnel, concerns about the differences between civilian and military cultures quickly came to the forefront.

The ensuing debate can be generally divided into three periods with different emphases in each. Much of this discussion is taken from a point paper written by Lindsay P. Cohn while a graduate student at Duke University. Her writing has been widely used as a source of simplifying the analysis of the civil-military gap debate. Dr. Cohn is now on the faculty at the United States Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

The first period, roughly beginning with the end of World War II and ending in about 1973 with the end of the military draft in the United States, was primarily concerned with defining civil-military relations, understanding the concept of professionalism, and learning how civilians actually controlled the military. As discussed above, Huntington and Janowitz dominated the debate.

The second period started in about 1973, with the end of conscription and the establishment of the [all-volunteer force](#), and continued until the end of the [Cold War](#). This period was concerned with the supposed lessons of the [Vietnam War](#), how the volunteer force changed the nature of the armed forces, and whether those changes led to wider gaps between military and civilian societies.

The third period, beginning with the end of the [Cold War](#) and continuing today, has seen an increasing interest in and concern about the existence of a "civil-military culture gap." The discussion has centered around four questions:

1. Whether such a gap exists in the first place? (Most agree it does.)
2. What is the nature of the gap?
3. Does the gap matter?
4. If it does matter, what is causing it? What changes in policy might be required to mitigate negative effects?

What is the nature of the gap?

While the debate surrounding a presumed culture gap between civilian and military societies had continued since at least the early 1950s, it became prominent in the early 1990s with the conclusion of the Cold War. The promised "[peace dividend](#)" led to a debate over changes in American [national security strategy](#) and what that would mean in terms of the transformation of the mission, composition, and character of the armed forces.

The gap debate revolved around two related concepts:

1. The notion of a cultural gap, i.e., the differences in the culture, norms, and values of the military and civilian worlds, and
2. The notion of a connectivity gap, i.e., the lack of contact and understanding between them.

Few argued that there was no difference between the two worlds, but some were convinced that the difference itself was the primary danger. Charles Maynes worried that a military force consisting primarily of enlisted personnel from the lower socio-economic classes would ultimately refuse to fight for the goals of the upper classes. Tarr and Roman on the other hand, were concerned that the similarities between military elites and civilian elites enabled a dangerous politicizing trend among the military. Chivers represented a small number who believed that the differences between the cultures were so small as essentially to be irrelevant.

Reasons for the cultural and connectivity gaps vary widely. The self-selective nature of the [All-Volunteer Force](#) is seen by some to have led to the unrepresentative nature of the armed forces One argument, put forward by a Navy Chief of Chaplains, was that the drawdown in the size of the military was exacerbating differences and making the separation between the military and civilian societies potentially even more divisive. He worried that unless an effective dialogue could be maintained between the military and civilian branches of society, especially in the area of ethical decision-making, the American military risked losing the support of society or becoming dangerously militaristic. Others argued that the increase in diversity among military personnel has actually strengthened ties between society and the military, especially those ties weakened by the results of the Vietnam War. Most were persuaded that the societal effects of the [Vietnam War](#) remained central to the cultural differences.

One unique view, which does not neatly fall into either of the cultural- or connectivity-gap categories, centers on the organizational differences between the military and civilian societies. This view claims to explain much as to why the military has been or may be used to press ahead of society's norms. This view goes beyond the simpler cultural-gap approach and emphasizes the ability of the military society to control the behavior and attitudes of its members in ways not possible in the more open civilian society, as evidenced by such phenomena as desegregation of the military and inclusion of women in the military.

Why does the gap matter?

Ultimately, the cultural gap matters only if it endangers civilian control of the military or if it reduces the ability of the country to maintain an effective military force. Those who concentrate on the nature of the gap tend not to be concerned about dangerous trends. However, those who are concerned about the lack of understanding between the civilian and military worlds are uniformly convinced that the civil-military relationship in the United States is unhealthy. Specifically, they have voiced concerns about a military that may become openly contemptuous of civilian norms and values and may then feel free to openly question the value of defending such a society. Others worry whether an inexperienced civilian government will undermine the military by ineffective or inappropriate policies, thus threatening U.S. national security.

This debate has generally settled on whether or not the gap is too wide. If too wide, civilian control of the military may be jeopardized due to serious misunderstandings between the two worlds. While most agree that such a gap is to be expected and, in and of itself, is not dangerous, some do concede the aspects of that gap have led directly to misunderstandings between the two

worlds. In particular, some have argued that the culture of political conservatism and the apparent increase in partisanship of the officer corps has approached a dangerous limit. Nearly all agree that it is possible for the cultural gap to be either too wide or too narrow, but there is wide disagreement as to where the current situation rests on that continuum. While Elizabeth Kier argues that "structure and function do not determine culture," most agree that a difference between the two is necessary because civilian culture was "incommensurate with military effectiveness."

Correcting the problem

Assuming that a problem exists, many have offered suggestions for narrowing the gap and correcting the problems arising from it. In general, those suggestions are along three lines. The first is that the military must reach out to the civilian world. Given the essentially universal agreement that civilians must control the military, the duty falls upon the military to find ways to talk to civilians, not the other way around. The second is that civilians must articulate a clear vision of what they expect in terms of the military mission. And the final suggestion is that the most practical and effective means of bringing about dialogue and understanding is to be bilateral education, in which both military and civilian elites would jointly attend specialized schools. Such schooling would emphasize military-strategic thinking, American history and political philosophy, military ethics, and the proper relationship between civil and military authority.

Some argue that the root problem is that the military is self-selecting, rendering the culture a self-perpetuating one. Solutions such as the reinstatement of the draft and a European-style national service obligation have been offered. but none appear to have made any progress toward adoption.

Contemporary issues

A common issue that hinders many civil-military relations is when civil political leaders attempt to resume or gain a certain degree of civilian control after a period of transition, conflict or dictatorship, but do not possess the necessary capacities and commitment to handle defense affairs. What should happen in such transitions is that when military figures begin to be withdrawn from political positions in order to achieve some balance, is that civilian politicians should be taught to deal with policy formulation and given an oversight on the defense sector so as to efficiently replace the former military leaders. However, civilian control over the military, despite the efforts that have been made over the past years, has yet to become institutionalized in many countries. The challenges that civil-military relations face in many countries, such as Indonesia, center around problems of military culture, overlapping coordination, authority, lack of resources and institutional deficits. The military cannot continue to be an organization with unmatched institutional reach and political influence, while limiting state capacity, because in doing so it will be evermore challenging for civilian supremacy to take a stance, thus establishing effective civil-military relations. If these problems are not addressed properly, as long as civil-military relations of countries continue to interact within undefined boundaries, without clear subordination and authority and with the constrictions of limited budgets, it is unlikely that countries that still struggle with the concept will achieve a stable and efficient civil-military relationship, something that will continue to damage state capacity and stability.

Civil–military relations in Afghanistan

Researchers from the [Overseas Development Institute](#) wrote that 'the belief that development and reconstruction activities are central to security'...'is a central component of western involvement' and that this has been 'highly contentious among aid agencies, perhaps nowhere more so than [Afghanistan](#).' Their April 2013 paper includes the following three key messages -

- Stabilisation approaches are likely to continue to present challenges to the aid community's ability to act according to humanitarian principles in conflict-affected, fragile and postconflict environments. Experiences in Afghanistan highlight significant tension, if not conflict, between stabilisation and internationally recognised guidelines and principles governing civil–military interaction.
- Civil–military dialogue was markedly more effective when it was rooted in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and strategic argumentation, as with advocacy focused on reducing harm to civilians.
- Aid agencies need to invest more in capacity and training for engaging in civil–military dialogue and, together with donors, seek to generate more objective evidence on the impact of stabilisation approaches.

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